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The diffusion of sales force automation (SFA) systems has enabled a far more systematic approach to sales force 
management. This opens new avenues for the academic study of the industrial selling process as well: new arenas 
for investigation, new windows into salesperson behavior, and new methodological pitfalls. The purpose of this 
dissertation is to develop a better understanding of SFA from an academic perspective, and then apply these insights 
to resolve gaps in our understanding of how sales forces behave and how they might be better managed. To do this, 
three areas of analysis are explored: methodological, behavioral, and theoretical. 
  
  
Sales Force Automation: An Examination of Issues 
 
The diffusion of sales force automation (SFA) systems has enabled a far more systematic 
approach to sales force management. This opens new avenues for the academic study of the 
industrial selling process as well: new arenas for investigation, new windows into salesperson 
behavior, and new methodological pitfalls. The purpose of this dissertation is to develop a better 
understanding of SFA from an academic perspective, and then apply these insights to resolve 
gaps in our understanding of how sales forces behave and how they might be better managed. To 
do this, three areas of analysis are explored: methodological, behavioral, and theoretical.  
 
Essay 1 examines SFA data from a research methods perspective. What is this data? What are 
the potential methodological challenges and opportunities inherent in SFA data? In doing so, the 
conceptualization of system utilization is advanced by introducing a new element to the simple 
use/non-use dichotomy: that of opportunistic utilization. Insights are developed to better 
understand the drivers of data quality in research and practice. Additionally, there is a discussion 
of the potential for opportunistic utilization to interact with naïve performance response models 
to create destructive interactions between the two.  
 
In Essay 2, data from a salesforce automation system is used to explore an important question in 
pipeline management. The foundation of sales force management theory is the assumption of 
classical rationality on the part of the salesman; given that their incentives are aligned 
appropriately with those of the firm, the salesman is expected to perform optimally through self-
management. This study applies work in cognitive biases to show that this assumption is 
inappropriate. As salesmen continually make investments in the uncertain industrial sales cycle, 
  
their periodic go/no-go decisions create an escalation of commitment dynamic which causes 
them to over-invest in losing opportunities. Over time, prospects for which there is no clear 
endpoint accumulate in the salesman’s pipeline, crowding out genuinely profitable opportunities. 
This sclerosis effect is tested empirically by examining a major industrial sales force’s 
opportunity management practices as recorded in an SFA system.  
 
Essay 3 shifts, obliquely, to the implications of SFA-driven management on organizational 
performance, by distinguishing between ordinary variation in commensurated variables 
(heterogeneity) and observed characteristics unique to a particular relational partner 
(idiosyncrasy). Idiosyncratic variations, by their nature as novel and unlikely-to-be-repeated 
events, represent fruitful potential opportunities for competitive advantage because their novelty 
provides the isolating mechanism that ensures inimitability. However, for this potential to be 
realized, the opportunity must be detected and exploited.  
 
Sales managers have traditionally been forced to rely on outcome based controls and bottom-up 
management styles. SFA gives manager the capability to manage sales opportunities individually 
and systematically in a way that they have never been able to do before. But should they? To 
what extent are the bottom-up and top-down approaches effective in maximizing salesperson 
effectiveness? Under what conditions are managers to favor autonomy and adaptation, as 
opposed to consistency and centralization? We study the boundary conditions for different 
approaches to sales strategy, and conceptual issues related to the competing demands of 
centralization and autonomy. 
  
  
Opportunistic Utilization: SFA Data Integrity and the Strategic Potemkin Village  
 
Introduction 
Prior work in sales force automation (SFA) has looked primarily at two important 
questions: the drivers of SFA adoption (Baker and Delpechitre 2013; Cascio, Mariadoss, and 
Mouri 2010), and the relationship between adoption and performance (Holloway, Deitz, and 
Hansen 2013; Rapp, Agnihotri and Forbes 2008; Sharma and Sheth 2010). The purpose of the 
current research is to explore a subtly different topic by introducing a new concept: that of 
“opportunistic utilization”. The study relaxes the assumption that all utilization of a salesforce 
automation system is “use as intended” (Jelinek 2013; Khazanchi 1995) and that system usage 
directly equates to system adoption. Instead, this research looks at the possibility that users of an 
IT system designed to manage their behavior will engage in deceptive reporting to either mislead 
or conceal activity from the system.  
 In the current research study, we explore the issue of misleading reports in an SFA 
context, proposing that salespeople may use the IS system to deceptively omit or mis-report their 
activities for the purpose of provoking a desired managerial response. For example, a firm may 
by policy restrict access to resources such as expensive product demonstrations to prospect 
accounts that exceed a threshold for the probability of winning. A salespeople who desires access 
to these resources anyway could simply reset this variable in the computer system for long 
enough to complete the requisition process.  
This is the result of the adverse selection (Eisenhardt 1989) that occurs when salespeople 
have different goals from their employers and so take advantage of information asymmetries to 
acquire firm resources that suit their purposes (such as closing a short term transaction and 
  
earning the resulting commission) but do not necessarily support the firm’s overall goals 
(improving long-term forecasting and forging long-term, profitable relationships). 
A second type of problem activity concerning SFA systems involves concealing selling 
activities from the firm. These actions consist of pursuing some or all of a sales opportunity “off 
the books” and away from scrutiny from the firm’s computer system. For example, a salespeople 
who desired greater autonomy might simply refuse to enter an opportunity into the system until it 
is close to closing (Moutot and Bascoul 2008). Sales which never reach this point are therefore 
totally untracked by the system. 
The purpose of this paper is to address the following issues. First, does sales force 
utilization of SFA necessarily equate to utilization as prescribed by the firm, and if not, in what 
ways might compliance be evaded, manipulated, or gamed? We then examine and discuss some 
criteria to use that allow a firm to evaluate the validity of particular pieces of data if there are 
concerns that non-compliance may be occurring. We conclude by discussing the possible 
consequences for an organization that is experiencing widespread gaming of the SFA system. 
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Agency theory is concerned with addressing problems that occur in business relationships 
(Eisenhardt 1989). It is particularly suited for studying sales-related topics since it includes 
interdependent parties -- a firm and its agents -- where there is a division of labor, asymmetry of 
information, and the cooperating parties have different goals (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jones 
and Butler 1992). More specifically, agency theory addresses the problems that may occur when 
these two cooperating parties are in conflict but the principal cannot easily observe or assess 
what their agent is doing (Eisenhardt 1989). Under an agency theoretic, information asymmetry 
permits one party to act opportunistically without being detected by the other.  
  
Agency theory has a long history of application to salesforce management, especially in 
clarifying questions of incentive structures such as compensation (e.g. John and Weitz 1989, 
Coughlan and Sen 1989, and Albers 1996). The conditions under which the agency theoretic 
operates manifest very strongly in a sales context. Salespeople can often work independently 
with very little direct supervision on a daily or even weekly work cycle. They call on customers 
at the customer’s location and engage in a number of activities simultaneously. The process of 
closing a sale is a socially complex, multidimensional phenomenon rich in social and 
psychological factors that are difficult to observe and measure independently. The difficulty in 
overseeing and controlling salesperson behaviors is one reason why some firms chose to use an 
outcome-based control system (Ouchi 1980, Anderson and Oliver 1989; Cravens, Ingram, 
LaForge and Young 1993) focusing on results rather than how those results are achieved.  
An example of the opacity and social complexity of the selling process can be illustrated 
by looking at a single sales call. A single sales call can have multiple goals and potential 
outcomes. In a meeting with a customer, a salesperson may be trying to do any one or more of 
the following: gather information about the customer’s needs, position their own offering as a 
viable selection, assess the nature and state of the customer’s decision-making process, develop a 
personal relationship with the prospect, assess and manipulate competitive effects, identify the 
potential for other future sales opportunities for this client, qualify whether the customer is a 
viable prospect who is worth future meetings, secure meetings or references to other decision-
makers in the customer’s firm or other firms, or negotiate selling terms such as price, quality, 
delivery, or financing (Marshall et al. 1999, Moncrief 1986). All of these different tasks can 
occur during the same sales call; in some cases the salesperson does not know ex ante what their 
goals will be until they have assessed and classified the customer through dialog.  
  
By choosing to utilize outcome-based controls to align salesperson incentives with the 
firm’s goals, a firm attempts to forestall its agents using the opacity of their positions to pursue 
their own goals at the firm’s expense (Ouchi 1980, Anderson and Oliver 1987). However, these 
alignments are often imprecise. While most firms attempt to be profit-maximizers, many firms 
(including the firm studied here), determine salesforce compensation by a commission on 
revenue, not gross profit (Zoltners et al. 2009). A salesperson operating under such a 
compensation regime could increase his or her commissions by accepting lower profit (for 
example, through discounting, or by means of changing their recommended product/service mix 
or allocation of effort across their portfolio of prospective customers) to maximize revenue.  
Another way in which this effect can manifest is in relationship-building. In addition to 
its associated contractual, procedural, and substantive interconnections, an interorganizational 
relationship is a multi-dyadic construct composed of many individual relationships between 
boundary spanners in each organization. Both the salesperson and their firm cooperate to forge 
customer loyalty; however, they also compete for primacy as to which entity the customer 
orients his primary loyalty (Palmatier et al. 2007). In pursuit of this goal, salespeople are often 
resistant to adopt knowledge-sharing and management systems, believing (rightly) that these 
systems are intended in part to reduce the firm’s dependency on their customer-specific 
knowledge and relationships (Kasper 2005).  
In addition, selling firms and their agents (salespeople) may have different attitudes 
toward risk which can lead to front-line salespeople and their immediate managers preferring a 
different ordering of actions because of their risk preference and motivations (Eisenhardt 1989). 
These different actions can take the form of selection of accounts to call upon, data to enter into 
a SFA system, and commitments to customers. The decision about what is the ideal 
  
manifestation, prioritization, and allocation of limited attentional and effort resources may differ 
depending on whether one examines the question from the point of view of the firm or its agent, 
the salesperson.  
Depending on how salespeople are compensated, they may undertake behaviors that are 
potentially detrimental to a firm’s long-term goals (Anderson and Oliver 1987). For example, if a 
salesperson is rewarded on sales volume, a very high-volume but low-profit sale may be very 
attractive even though the firm might prefer that effort be spent trying to close smaller deals with 
higher margins that allowed the selling firm to make increased profits (Cichelli 2010; Zoltners 
2006). An extreme example is where a salesperson sells a product at a slight loss; this results in a 
net reduction in profits for the company but since revenue is positive the salesperson still 
receives a commission. Conversely, a salesperson compensated on profits might fail to pursue a 
deal with a customer that offered little in the way of current profits, but that had strategic 
potential to the firm over the long-run. In both instances the salesperson is engaging in behaviors 
that can conflict with their firm’s best interests but further the individual’s own agenda.  
 
Salesforce Automation Usage 
The technology acceptance model (Davis 1989) derives from the theory of reasoned 
action (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980). It posits that ease of use and perceived usefulness drive 
positive attitude towards a system, which in turn drives behavioral intent to use and therefore 
utilization behavior. Utilization is presumed to be dichotomous; either the system is used or it is 
not. If failure to utilize the system or failure to use a system enough is widespread, the entire 
implementation at the organizational level is threatened (Jones, et al. 2006). While organizations 
implement information systems for the benefit of the firm, the importance of perceived 
  
usefulness in driving successful adoption means that companies must emphasize to employees 
the benefits to the individual user (Moutot and Bascoul 2008). Failure to implement successfully 
can result in the huge investments in technology required being wasted (Parthasarathy and Sohi 
1997). Moreover, failed implementations can lead to reduced job satisfaction and organizational 
commitment by individual salespeople (Speier and Venkatesh 2002). 
Salesforce automation systems are specialized CRM systems optimized to the 
management of organizations engaged in lengthy, complex-sale relationships. Such systems 
encompass elements of the sales cycle spanning from lead generation, to prospecting, 
qualification, organization of sales team, relationship tracking tools, recording of decision-
making processes and customer-specific information, all the way to contract negotiation, 
fulfillment and post-sale account management (Bush, Moore and Rocco 2005; Holloway, Dietz, 
and Hansen 2013). Drivers to salesforce automation adoption include personal innovativeness, 
support services (Robinson et al. 2005), non-monetary costs, interpersonal links, previous 
company experience, and personal/demographic factors (Parthasarathy and Sohi,1997), which 
act through the usefulness / ease of use perceptions of the salesperson. 
There is considerable interest in studying salesperson ethical and unethical behavior in 
business settings (Bellizzi and Hite 1989; Kaynak and Sert 2012; Jaramillo, Mulki and Boles 
2013). On the other hand, there has not been a substantial amount of research examining the 
issue of deception in the use of Salesforce Automation Systems (SFA) to mask salesperson 
activities. Cicala et al. (2014) raise two important questions in this area: the use of SFA data in 
monitoring salesperson behavior, and the impact that this has on the decision by salespeople to 
engage in unethical behavior. However, they do not specifically address the question of one 
particular type of unethical behavior: the manipulation of data to provide a manager with an 
  
incomplete or deceptive picture of a salesperson’s behavior. Yet, given the importance of SFA in 
the current sales environment, the misuse of such a vital link between a firm and its customer 
base is a critical issue -- particularly if the system is being manipulated to the salesperson’s 
financial advantage.  
Due to the boundary spanning nature of most sales positions (Behrman and Perreault 
1984; Boles et al. 2012) firms are continually seeking ways of having additional insight and 
control over their salespeople. One way additional control can be exerted on the firm’s “agents” 
is through the compensation system and the sales management process (Anderson and Oliver 
1989; Cravens, Ingram, LaForge, and Young 1993). Proper utilization of the electronic SFA 
technologies available today can provide sales managers and higher level executives within the 
organization a better understanding of what salespeople are doing and how their actions will 
affect the firm (Tanner, et al. 2005; Zablah, Bellenger and Johnston 2004). 
In today’s sales environment, companies often use SFA to accomplish a number of 
important activities. Within a firm’s sales organization, SFA can be used to: monitor their 
salespeople’s behavior’ adjudicate managerial policies; enhance customer satisfaction, keep track 
of sales/service related activities within a given account; and derive insights about the drivers of 
profitability (Holloway, Deitz and Hansen 2013; Moutot and Bascoul 2008; Landry, Arnold, and 
Arndt 2005). Indeed, these are the raison d’etre for an SFA system in the first place (Delvecchio 
2014). Given the principal-agent dynamic between salespeople and their managers, it is 
inevitable that this behavior will also manifest through their interactions on information systems.  
Selling behaviors are very hard to observe systematically in the field. Therefore, the lack 
of direct oversight on many sales activities means that, for many firms, the primary source of 
information about customer relationships and information related to the account is the SFA 
  
system (Babu et al. 2014; Landry, Arnold and Arndt 2005). The system, in turn, receives much 
of its information from salespeople who directly enter reports concerning their actions and 
observations about the customer firm about which they are reporting.  
The implications of what is entered in the system can have a significant effect on the 
salesperson’s career (Deeter-Schmelz and Kennedy 2004; Speier and Venkatesh 2002; Cicala et 
al. 2014). Decisions about retention, compensation, and work environment are all potentially 
data-driven when an SFA system is in place. Opportunistic behavior in this situation manifests as 
entering or failing to enter data intended to manipulate these decisions, either through intentional 
deception, or more obliquely through biases in reporting and impression management.  
In some cases, the data entered can be audited. For example, a salesperson who reports 
that they have closed a particular account at a specific dollar amount will report this in their SFA 
system, but it can be cross-checked to the customer purchase order, records in the accounting 
system, etc. In other cases, the sole source of information about the customer comes from the 
salesperson’s representations in the system (Buttle, Ang, and Iriana 2006). A salesperson’s 
intuition about a particular customer’s readiness to buy based on a private meeting between the 
salesperson and the customer cannot be easily verified. There are no independent records of the 
meeting and the information being reported is laden in ambiguity. Thus, for some fields of 
information, a very high degree of information asymmetry exists between the principal (firm) 
and agent (salesperson). Deceptive reporting has already been identified as being a serious 
problem for information systems in terms of the proportion of data affected, the persistence of 
the deceptive data in the system, and the difficulty in detecting and correcting it (Biros et al. 
2002). This leads to our first research question: 
 
  
RQ1: In what ways might entries in an SFA system not reflect actual selling activity by 
the sales force?  
 
Operationalizing Utilization as Intended 
 Utilization of information systems are measured in a variety of ways, and the best 
operationalization of utilization remains a subject of active research (Schillewaert et al. 2005). 
Straub, et al. (1995) stated that “there is widespread agreement among researchers that system 
usage is the primary variable through which IT affects white collar performance because it is a 
necessary, albeit insufficient, requisite for deriving the benefits of IT.” (emphasis in original), 
and found that while most self-report measures of utilization correlate strongly with one another, 
and most observed measures have strong intercorrelations, the correlations between observed and 
self-reported measures are comparatively weaker. Straub speculates that an unobserved latent 
factor exists which subtly distinguishes between objectively measured operation of the system 
and the user’s own beliefs about how much they use the system.  
In this vein, SFA system utilization has been measured in a variety of ways; for example 
Ahearne et al. (2008) validated his measure of salesforce automation utilization using several 
observed and self-reported instruments and found substantial agreement among them.  However, 
distinguishing between use of the system and use-as-intended requires a shift from aggregate 
measures of undifferentiated use to examining particular dimensions of user / SFA interaction. 
To identify misuse of the SFA system, it is first necessary to properly delineate use as intended. 
Use as intended is defined here to mean use of the SFA system in accordance with established 
policies and procedures, in support of the goals assigned to the salesperson by the firm.  
  
The Focal Firm 
Salesforce automation records for a large multinational corporation were analyzed for 
indicators of opportunistic utilization. The data itself is described in the Methodology section to 
follow; for the present it suffices to describe the company itself and its SFA utilization policies.  
The focal firm is a major global vendor of information technology products. This paper 
focuses on operations in the company’s North American region over a period of one year, selling 
hardware as well as associated software, system integration services, and consumables. One 
hundred fifty seven salespeople called on business customers in geographically determined 
territories. The salespeople had the authority to assemble sales teams as needed on an ad hoc 
basis from a pool of available team members. Turnover was approximately 15% in the period 
studied. Typical opportunities took about eight months to close and produced revenue in the six 
to seven figure range (see table 1 in the Methodology section). 
Management of the sales team follows two concurrent processes. On one hand, 
salespeople are given outcome-based controls, with advice and supervision from regional and 
divisional sales managers. On the other hand, a dedicated analytics group manages the salesforce 
automation system and issues benchmarks, goals, and policies and other behavior-based controls. 
These two systems co-exist.  
All sales opportunities being pursued were required to be logged in the salesforce 
automation system. Sales representatives received some prospects forwarded to them from 
Marketing’s lead generation efforts (7%). These opportunities were forwarded to salespeople 
automatically as part of their lead-generation system; salespeople had discretion to pursue these 
leads or not, but not to delete or otherwise retroactively edit them. Most opportunities (93%) 
stemmed from their own prospecting activities and had to be entered by the salespeople 
themselves. Sales which were won had to be entered into the system for fulfillment to occur and 
  
for revenue to be received. Open opportunities were subject to monitor and review by sales 
managers. Salespersons have broad latitude to pursue prospects in the manner they deem best, 
with periodic review from a sales manager. The the firm’s policy was: 
Policy: All opportunities are required to be entered into the SFA system.  
The company’s policy was for sales executives to follow a seven step sales process. 
Opportunities which were lost or qualified out were truncated when it became apparent that they 
were not viable; however, winning sales were typically expected to follow all seven steps.  From 
this, the firm’s policy was: 
Policy: All opportunities must follow the progression of sales steps.  
Sales in the first two steps (Suspect and Qualifying) were expected to meet a 30% 
probability of success estimate. Opportunities permitted into the Needs Analysis, Solution 
Development, Demonstration, and Proposal phases were required to meet a 60% probability of 
success threshold, in part due to the expense required to set up a demonstration of this large, 
unwieldy, and expensive equipment. Sales could only be marked Closing if in the salesperson’s 
opinion they had a 90% chance of being won. None of these benchmarks were measured 
empirically. Approximately 15% of successfully closed sales were later cancelled due to 
insufficient customer funds.  This resulted in a policy indicating:  
Policy: An opportunity’s sales step should correspond to its probability of eventually being 
won.  
 
Misleading Reports 
Salespeople are often called on to make estimations of the success of individual 
opportunities and aggregate forecasts of customer demand (Kumar, Venkatesan, and Reinartz 
  
2006). Information gained from salesperson estimations can be of use for making finance, 
capacity, and strategic forecasting decisions (Dickie 2013). They can also be of use in evaluating 
a retention decision for an under-performing sales representative. A manager with a marginal 
salesperson faces a difficult decision: retain an underperforming employee or suffer the 
disruption and cost of employee turnover by replacing them (Boles et al. 2012; Darmon 2004). 
Even if replacement is the decision, there is no guarantee that the newly hired replacement will 
be more effective. In such a circumstance, when it is believed that a salesperson will generate 
higher customer equity in the future, their perceived value is comparatively higher and may 
counterbalance low customer equity in the present. Lacking a quantitative approach to 
forecasting new business, managers may be forced to rely on their intuition (Kumar et al. 2014).  
For a salesperson under review, misrepresenting their salesforce activity by providing 
overly-optimistic forecasts inflates their value as perceived by their employers. This can serve to 
delay an otherwise likely termination.  
 
Bluebirds and evading managerial oversight 
In addition to providing information useful for making immediate HR decisions 
regarding employees, SFA systems also provide useful information about customers and can 
assist in forecasting future sales. Firms and salespeople behave interdependently in their attempts 
to forge strong customer relationships and working cooperatively to strengthen the overall 
relationship quality -- while at the same time competing to establish the customer’s primary 
loyalty to themselves (Palmatier 2007). Salespeople are often selected based on the pre-existing 
industry contacts they bring to the firm, but companies will use a variety of techniques to protect 
its portfolio of customers so a departing salesperson cannot take those contacts from the firm 
when they leave. Similarly, since a salesperson’s bargaining position vis a vis its employer 
  
derives in part from the exclusivity of their contacts and selling techniques, they have a vested 
interest in preventing this knowledge from diffusing into the firm (Bush, Moore, and Rocco 
2005; Buttle, Ang and Iriana 2006). Indeed, some salespeople even store their contact lists in a 
separate program or even on a separate computer from the one issued by the company.  
As part of the general process of interacting with an SFA system, employees are 
obligated to enter information about a potential customer as they are being pursued. Where this 
requires divulging exclusive customer information to the firm, there will be resistance to 
compliance. In Orlikowski’s (1992) study on adoption of Lotus Notes in “Alpha” corporation, 
issues of competing incentives between the firm and its employees were rife. Employees were 
resistant to training on or using the system because they perceived time spent entering the system 
as “non-billable hours” that were discouraged by the firm. Employees were also concerned that 
entering client-specific information into the system would make that information available to 
other salespeople and even managers, who could then take the information with them to 
competitors if they were poached. Finally, the consultants in this company were resistant to 
placing their forecasts, estimates, and commitments to customers, noting that they constituted a 
“paper trail” through which blame might be assigned later if these proved to be in error.  
In some cases, divulging the customer information is either harmless or unavoidable. For 
example, prospects developed from third-party lead generation do not use a salesperson’s 
personal network of contacts and are in any event reported into the system by a third party 
rewarded for entering these contacts. In other cases, such as where a salesperson pursues a 
prospect that they know from their own social network, there may be a strong temptation to hide 
that privileged information from the employer for as long as possible. Thus, a customer may be 
  
pursued “off the books” to protect information which gives a salesperson value and negotiating 
leverage with their firm.  
Ultimately, a successful pursuit results in a business transaction. This transaction requires 
fulfillment from other actors in a firm, a monetary record of the sale in an accounting system, 
and compensation for the salesperson in the form of outcome-based controls such as 
commissions. All of these events require reference to documentation in the SFA system to 
process. So successful transactions with prospects generated by their salesperson’s own lead-
generating activities must be reported in the SFA system. How, then, might a salesperson square 
the sudden appearance of a fully-consummated customer opportunity with the requirement that 
they report every step of the pursuit of their opportunities? Fortunately for the opportunistic 
utilizer of an SFA system, there is an escape.  
A “bluebird” is a sales opportunity that requires minimal pursuit. In the archetypal 
bluebird, a customer contacts the salesperson, having already selected their firm as the vendor 
and is prepared to buy immediately. With little selling effort, the salesperson need only perform 
perfunctory order-taking functions for the firm to achieve a transaction and for the salesperson to 
receive their commission (Zoltners et al. 2006).  
When a salespeople enters a new customer opportunity into the system and then 
immediately closes the transaction successfully, this might be a genuine bluebird. On the other 
hand, it might also represent a salesperson fulfilling the minimum possible record-keeping 
requirements prior to closing business with a customer. Such a customer might have been 
pursued for a long time “off the books” and thus without the knowledge of the firm. If the 
opportunity closes successfully they can be entered as a simulated bluebird, but until then, the 
salesperson retains exclusive control over valuable information related to the customer contact.  
  
Distinguishing between exceptional customer events and salesperson obfuscation can be 
difficult. Indeed, if it were easy to detect, salespeople would not be tempted to engage in the 
behavior. However, the exogenous nature of bluebirds allows us to detect opportunistic 
utilization of the SFA system. Closure rates for bluebirds should not vary based on selling 
ability, because a genuine bluebird is an entirely exogenous event. Where no selling activities 
occur, we should see no systematic differences in closure rates between salespeople based on 
selling ability. Where these differences do exist, it suggests that selling activities are occurring 
but have been omitted from the system.  
 
Misuse of Resources 
 
Another example of deception tactics in opportunistic utilization involves manipulating 
managerial commitments of resources (Goldman 2010). Sales support resources include travel 
and entertainment budgets, the addition of subject matter experts to the selling team, non-selling 
resources such as R&D for customized development, or the application of hardware, support, and 
logistical resources for demonstrations are limited. Managers are charged with applying these 
resources in ways that maximize the profitability of the organization.  
However, even as salespeople work together in teams, they must also compete for access 
to these resources. In organizations where these selling costs are not assessed on a per-
opportunity or per-salesperson basis, they represent a “free” resource from the perspective of a 
commission-maximizing salesperson.  In such a scenario, given their willingness to maximize 
commissions at the expense of his or her firm’s (principals) profitability, a salespeople (agent) 
could misrepresent the probability of closure, timing, or forecast revenue of a prospect to 
encourage their manager to apply these limited resources to that salesperson’s opportunities, as 
opposed to those of his or her colleagues. This scenario is an example of a lie of commission, 
  
deception intended to provoke a desired managerial response, whereas avoiding managerial 
scrutiny is a lie of omission. Both are forms of deception meant to insulate the salesperson from 
organizational discipline.  
Methodology 
Data 
The focal firm’s salesforce automation records were analyzed for indicators of 
opportunistic utilization. The data reflects selling efforts in the company’s North American 
region over a period of one year: hardware as well as associated software, system integration 
services, and consumables. A linear transformation was applied to the data to ensure the 
company’s confidentiality; the company received an advance copy of this paper but had no 
power of prior restraint. One hundred fifty seven salespeople called on business customers in 
over six thousand sales opportunities; more than 2,400 were successful. As mentioned above, 
turnover was approximately 15% in the period studied. Typical opportunities took about eight 
months to close and produced revenue in the six to seven figure range (See Figure 1).  
Interestingly, a large proportion of sales opportunities were “bluebirds”; that is, 
successfully closed within a few days with little or no reported sales effort. Legitimate bluebirds 
occur when a customer has an immediate need for a product, has already made the decision to 
buy, and selected a vendor. In this scenario, the salesperson functions as an order-taker only; 
little or no selling effort is expended. In this study, according to data available from the SFA 
system, bluebirds make up 9.4% of successful sales (approx. 230). Approximately one third of 
bluebirds come from clients with whom the firm had no prior relationship (35%).  
Figure 1 About Here 
  
 
 
Results 
Policy: All opportunities are required to be entered into the SFA system.  
Bluebirds 
Comparing alternative definitions of a bluebird demonstrated that while most 
opportunities follow a long sales cycle before resulting in a sale, many closed successfully within 
a day or two of being opened. For this study, a bluebird was defined as a deal that was won 
within 48 hours of being opened. Alternative thresholds of 24 and 168 hours were also tested; 
results remain substantially the same (See Table 1).  
 
(Table 1 about here.) 
 
  
Table 1: Variables of Interest 
Variable Min Max Mean St Dev Median Skew Kurt 
Sales Cycle Length (days) 0 2058 307 315 183 1.51 2.44 
Transaction Size (USD) * 12,913,000 189,631 394,763 87,500 11.30 241.22 
n = 6,201 
* Negative transactions (refunds) comprised less than 0.2% of the sample.  
 
While a typical sale closed after an approximately eight month evaluation period, more 
than 10.1% of successful opportunities (approx. 240), comprising 7.6% of the organization’s 
revenue, were alleged in the system to have been closed with two days or less of selling effort 
(See Figure 2).  
 
(Figure 2 about here.) 
 
  
 
 
While we cannot rule out that one customer in ten simply chooses not to evaluate their 
purchasing option in this competitive and highly complex market, this result is consistent with 
the pursuit of sales opportunities “off the books” and outside the scrutiny of management.  
We can also contrast conversion rates for bluebirds generated by the salespeople 
themselves with those generated by the marketing team as part of its lead generation efforts. 
When marketing identifies a prospective customer through its lead generation activities, it enters 
the prospect into the system before handing off this opportunity to the salesperson. Unlike 
opportunities entered by the salesperson, the salespeople has no control over the initiation of the 
opportunity within the SFA system.  
Twenty four percent of the opportunities pursued in the period under scrutiny were 
generated by marketing, but these marketing-originated leads resulted in only about 10% of 
  
successful sales. Bluebirds that appear among opportunities initiated by the salesperson make up 
9.4% of successfully closed sales. Marketing leads that resulted in bluebirds (i.e. closed in less 
than two days or less) comprised 0.7% of successful sales. Put another way, sales-generated 
leads convert to bluebirds at a rate of 4.35%, as opposed to 1.14% for marketing-generated leads. 
These conversion rates differ significantly (evaluated via Chi-square test, p<.01) (See Table 2).  
 
(Table 2 about here.) 
 
Table 2: Bluebird Conversion Rates 
 Marketing-generated Sales-generated 
Bluebirds 17 205 
All opportunities 1492 4709 
% conversion* 1.14% 4.35% 
* Significantly different (p <.01) 
 
 
Bluebirds and Selling Teams 
As a complex, high technology product, a team selling approach is often required to 
provide a customer with expertise related to different product mixes and capabilities. Selling 
teams consist of channel representatives, strategic account representatives, technical salespeople, 
and product line representatives, in addition to the sales executives themselves. Salespeople are 
empowered to select and assemble sales teams on an ad-hoc basis to meet customer-specific 
buying processes and requirements. Of the 6,201 sales opportunities studied in the relevant range 
  
during the time frame being examined, more than 42% were pursued using sales teams. 
Opportunities pursued using teams comprised 40% of the successful sales.  
Such teams require time to assess customer needs, assemble the skills and personnel 
relevant to the customer situation, and then deploy these skills to close the business (Ahearne, 
Mackenzie, Podsakoff, Mathieu and Lam 2010; Menguc, Auh, and Uslu 2013).  Yet, seventy 
sales opportunities, comprising 2.8% of successful opportunities and 7.1% of bluebirds, were 
closed using sales teams that allegedly assembled, deployed, and completed their tasks in two 
days or less.  
 
Policy: All opportunities must follow the progression of sales steps.  
The focal firm imposes a seven step sales process (see Figure 3). Leads that have been 
generated are marked as “Suspects”. Once a salesperson has contacted the customer, the sales 
opportunity is moved to the second or “Qualifying” stage, at which point the salesperson 
evaluates the prospect’s viability as a potential customer. During the third phase, “Needs 
Analysis”, the salesperson evaluates the prospect’s needs, whereupon the prospect moves to 
“Solution Development” which is the fourth phase in the required sales process, where the sales 
executive determines the optimum mix of products and services to offer to the prospect and 
produces a business case to cost-justify them. A fifth phase, “Demonstration”, calls for the 
salesperson to make a case for their offering versus competition and to offer product 
demonstrations or make available subject matter experts who can validate their claims and 
overcome product-based objections. In the “Proposal/Negotiation” phase (sixth phase), 
contractual terms are negotiated. Once the contract has been signed by both parties, the account 
enters the seventh and final phase where the sale is marked “Closing” until revenue is realized. 
  
The firm reported that typically 15% of signed customers would have insufficient funds to make 
payment, and the sales would be cancelled. Unsuccessful opportunities may end at any prior 
step, being moved straight to “Closed” status. An account is moved to the “Closed” status once 
either the revenue has been realized or the opportunity is deemed to have been lost. 
By company mandate, all or most successful sales opportunities should pass through each 
of these steps. The company’s sales analytics group often reviews the number, naming, and 
behavioral requirements of each step in the sales cycle in an attempt to optimize selling 
behaviors. However, in the period studied, none of the more than 2,400 successful sales 
opportunities completely and fully followed the mandated process. Only three opportunities 
followed five or more of the steps.  
While opportunities which had been unsuccessful can be expected to have passed through 
fewer steps, 88.4% of the opportunities which were successful had one or even zero steps 
reported in the SFA system. Fully 42.1% of successful sales opportunities were created at the 
“closed” step (See Table 3).  
 
(Figure 3 about here.) 
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Table 3: Sales Funnel 
 
 
Further research revealed that in the the six year period since the SFA system had been 
implemented, no sales opportunity in the system had ever fully followed the mandated 
procedure. Despite great attention being given to the number, nomenclature, and policies 
associated with each sales step by the analytics team, it appears that the entire sales force had 
ignored policy from the beginning.  
In the face of rampant non-compliance, it is useful to see which sales steps were entered 
in the system. By interviewing individual salespersons, a picture of the tacit norms used for sales 
cycle documentation began to emerge. Salespeople did not use the “Suspect” phase at all; this 
was purely used by marketers generating leads prior to hand-off. The “Qualifying”, “Solution 
Development”, and “Proposal/Negotiation” phases were used rarely and inconsistently 
depending on the sales executives’ personal preference. “Needs analysis” was the earliest step 
used by sales executives to “park” sales opportunities which they had reported pursuing but 
which were not ready to be forecast for immediate closure. “Demonstration” was used purely for 
product demonstrations.  According to company policy equipment could not be allocated or 
shipped to a prospect for an opportunity that had not reached this phase. “Closing” represents 
  
opportunities which were deemed very likely to close in the immediate future and therefore had 
been forecast on the sales executive’s pipeline (71% of these deals did in fact close successfully).  
(Figure 4 about here.) 
 
Figure 4: The Sales Funnel Illustrated 
 
Thus, a de facto sales process emerged, consisting of three steps, that describes most of 
the sales cycles in the period studied (See Table 3 and Figure 4). One step was reserved for 
marketing-generated leads. The second was for deals that were “in-process” but which the 
salesperson did not forecast for immediate closure. The final was for deals that were considered 
likely to close in the immediate future. Conformance to this tacit norm was consistent across all 
sales regions.  
 
Policy: An opportunity’s sales step should correspond to its probability of eventually being 
won.  
 
As part of the firm’s prescribed stepwise approach, salespeople are expected to provide 
an estimated probability of success for each opportunity. This serves two purposes. First, it 
  
provides both short- and long-term forecasting capability for the sales team. Second, it is 
designed to enforce disciplined qualification of potential customer relationships. Therefore, a 
sales opportunity at the Demonstration step is evaluated as having a 60% probability of closure, 
and also means that opportunities are not allowed to reach this step (and the attendant allocation 
of personnel and hardware for a product demonstration) without meeting a 60% win probability 
threshold.  
As noted in Table 3, the de facto behavior followed by the firm’s sales professionals 
diverges significantly from the de jure mandates specified in the company’s sales process policy, 
to the point that no successful sale has ever been recorded to have followed the entire sales 
process. Nevertheless, the probabilities of success are important to the functioning of the firm 
because they are still used in organizational planning and sales forecasting.  
Planning in the focal firm was concentrated in a single individual, a member of the 
finance team who had been seconded long before to the sales organization. In interviews, he 
described two major work tasks related to the industrial sales team. First was approval of sales 
team requests to authorize discounts. Beneath the list prices was a price floor specified by policy, 
and customers could only be offered a price lower than this minimum with approval from sales 
support (which is to say, from this individual). As with other companies (e.g. in Mantrala et al. 
1994), the firm did not have per-opportunity data on cost and so utilized revenue instead as the 
primary measure of performance. The employee reported that since deep discounts were the 
norm in the industry, and salespeople considered the price floor to be unreasonably high, in 
practice nearly every deal that closed went across his desk for pricing approval. Lacking per-
opportunity data on cost, such decisions were made primarily based on intuition and experience.  
  
The financial analyst was also required to generate short- and mid-term forecasts, as a 
supplement to those submitted by district and regional managers. Collectively, these forecasts 
formed the basis for corporate planning. Due to the proliferation of product lines and the short 
product lifecycles, production planning was limited to immediate needs and long-term planning 
was used for sales territory allocation and financial planning.  
 Sales steps fell into three broad categories (See Figure 4). Early stages (Suspect and 
Qualifying) collectively were ostensibly supposed to convert at a rate of approximately 30%; 
however, in practice this goal was deemed unrealistic by managers, analysts, and salespeople 
alike and so was ignored. The middle phases (Needs Analysis, Solution Development, 
Demonstration, and Proposal) were collectively intended to have a 60% win rate. Deals which 
had reached the “Closing” phase, were expected to convert at approximately 90%. In theory, this 
last group should have included deals which were listed as having been won, to reflect the fact 
that some customers would later cancel their contracts for lack of funds; however, in practice this 
group was treated separately.  
 However, forecasts proved to be wildly inaccurate. Salesmen pursued more than three 
hundred million dollars in overall revenue at the 30% probability tier, for an expected anticipated 
revenue of ninety three million. Of this, they achieved less than twenty eight million dollars, an 
overall forecast accuracy of just under 30% (see Table 4). Results were similar at the 60% tier, 
and applied whether the forecast was expressed in dollars or number of transactions. Forecast 
accuracy was higher at the 90% tier, but these were supposed to have been deals already all but 
finalized, and yet accuracy was still only 70%.  
 
(Table 4 about here.)  
  
 
  
  
 
Table 4: Aggregate sales forecasts and accuracy 
 $ Forecast $ Actual Accuracy # Forecast # Actual Accuracy 
30% 96,332,375 28,250,388 29.4% 1573 252 16.0% 
60% 203,721,037 70,797,889 34.8% 1475 437 29.6% 
90% 222,079,689 153,664,445 69.2% 1431 1018 71.1% 
 
 
Salespeople engage in opportunistic utilization, reporting (or failing to report) their 
business activities in ways geared to advance their own agendas -- possibly at the expense of 
those of their companies. These actions may come as a result of a downturn in the economy, an 
unrealistic compensation or control system, or simply unethical individuals seeking personal 
gain. Acting in their own interests, it is no surprise that the data these salespeople produce will 
be heavily biased unless carefully audited and tracked, a process that induces costs of its own. 
Such a finding aligns directly with what one might expect given the agency theory framework.  
Sales managers were quite open that at times it was necessary to game the system to 
pursue leads in ways that bypass what were perceived as overly restrictive or self-defeating 
policies from the analytics group. The analytics team recognized that data integrity was an issue, 
but did not consider addressing this a high priority.  
This is significant for three reasons. First, of course, it demonstrates that as a driver of 
salesperson behavior, the SFA system has been unsuccessful in this firm. This despite an 
ostensible 100% utilization rate; salespeople interacted with the system, but not according to 
policy.  
  
Second, it is revealing that the analytics group, charged with analyzing and tweaking the 
sales process, had done so little to measure compliance with policies already in place. Later 
conversations with analysts indicated that compliance was known to be a problem but one that 
was considered a long-term issue to be examined at some point in the future, in favor of the more 
immediate problems of optimizing the number and nature of steps in the sales process. This 
myopic approach illustrates that an analytics group can be a constituency in their own right, with 
its own interests, influences, and role in organizational politics. Individual analysts are subject to 
their own agency dilemmas as they act on behalf of the firm to control the sales force.  
The third problem was that despite severe data-quality and compliance issues, the SFA 
tool was nevertheless still used to evaluate and manage sales personnel. In the face of tacit norms 
for behavior that ignored or circumvented policies for SFA tool use, the analytics group 
continued to analyze SFA data and issue policy guidelines as if the data was reliable and as 
though its guidelines were being followed.  
What are the consequences of this for the firm when opportunistic utilization becomes 
accepted as a tacit norm for the salesforce? Consider the case where monitoring does not occur 
and where managers make decisions based on uncritically accepted SFA data. The de facto 
process is an emergent one where the sales team operates largely autonomously. The analytics 
group receives inaccurate data and based on this issues periodic dictates, which are largely 
ignored by the sales team. They wield considerable organizational power but this is almost 
entirely directed inward, towards salespeople in their activity within the organization and their 
reporting patterns to the company.  
In such a situation, salespeople practicing opportunistic utilization affect their colleagues’ 
behavior, the quality of results produced by analysts attempting to interpret the data they 
  
produce, and the integrity and acceptance of the IS system itself. Each of these will be 
considered in turn.  
Ethical Climate 
The immediate effect of opportunistic utilization is on individual salespeople. 
Salespeople who practice opportunistic utilization in their data reporting are likely to benefit 
from doing so, unless they are not observed and disciplined. In this study, we see evidence that 
salespeople failed to report ongoing sales activities, thus protecting their valuable network of 
contacts from being appropriated by their employer and preserving their relative bargaining 
position vis a vis their employer. Keeping the contact information secure is one way that 
salespeople have traditionally protected their position even before the advent of CRM systems 
(Bush, Moore, and Rocco 2005; Buttle, Ang and Iriana 2006). Similarly, salespeople who were 
relatively low performing and therefore whose jobs were endangered often reported larger and 
more robust pipelines than their actual portfolio of sales prospects justified. As with protection of 
contacts, this practice antedates the appearance of SFA systems. Whereas in the past these 
misrepresentations were made in person or via written report to their managers, sales 
professionals may now do so by entering data into an information system. The fact that the 
reporting is done over a computer does not stop salespeople from entering false or overly-
optimistic data projections. In doing so, they increased the perceived risk associated with firing 
them. Over time, employees in this situation may be more likely to be retained than others in the 
same situation who choose not to overstate their prospects.  
Absent a set of data integrity policies to ensure that data are reported accurately, 
salespeople are unlikely to be detected in their deceptive activities. Such a system selects for and 
rewards salespeople who engage in opportunistic utilization. Given this incentive structure, it is 
  
likely that widespread misreporting of data becomes common practice and an accepted norm 
within the sales force. Indeed, this follows the logic and patterns of other kinds of ethical 
decision-making behaviors in a company that collectively manifest as an ethical climate. 
Although not examined in this study, it is even possible that opportunistic utilization might 
contribute to the propensity of salespeople to engage in other kinds of unethical behavior.  
In the company studied, the researchers interviewed mid-tier sales managers and 
discovered that, indeed, misreporting was widespread and considered a “white lie” that had 
become a tacitly acceptable business practice. Salespeople felt that it was occasionally necessary 
to enter the data the system asked for to get the managerial response they felt was required, 
regardless of whether it was actually necessary.  
Evaluating SFA Systems for Data Integrity 
RQ2: What criteria can be used to allow a firm to evaluate the validity of particular pieces of 
data if there are concerns that non-compliance may be occurring? 
Data from information systems can be treated with inappropriate reverence because it is 
perceived as being from a computer, with managers forgetting that the data itself are self-reports 
from employees with a vested interest in the perceptions and decisions that flow from that data. 
To detect opportunistic utilization, one can draw from validity concepts associated with both data 
derived from observation, and data derived from self-report. These fall into three broad 
categories (see Figure 5).  
When evaluating an extant data set to diagnose possible cases of opportunistic utilization, 
it is necessary to look first at the data in the context of the process that produces it. This is 
analogous to using techniques that establish external validity, such as a nomological net (e.g. 
Straub et al. 2004). In the case of bluebirds, an entirely exogenous event was seen to behave very 
  
differently in the data depending on which agency within the organization happened to have 
recorded it in the SFA system.  
Second, one must look at the internal process that produced the data. Here, a sales 
executive is expected to assemble and manage a sales team so as to assist in winning the deal. If 
a deal is closed successfully within seventy two hours, there simply is no time to assemble and 
deploy these resources. A bluebird by definition simply doesn’t require this level of selling 
investment. Again, this is a sign that the salesperson’s reported behavior may not correspond to 
his or her actual behavior in the field.  
Finally, one can look at the organizational outcomes expected from the contents of one’s 
self-reports of their behavior. Reports that invite unwanted scrutiny, appropriation of information 
a salesperson would prefer remains exclusive, or which have strong implications for the 
salesperson’s retention or compensation can be expected to increase the temptation to utilize the 
SFA system opportunistically.  
 
(Figure 5 about here) 
 
 
  
Potemkin Village Effect 
RQ3: What possible consequences might ensue for an organization that is experiencing 
widespread gaming of the SFA system? 
 
Information from the system is virtually useless for any long-range sale forecast since 
few, if any, sales follow the prescribed sales process and many are opened and closed within a 
matter of days (bluebird sales). The desire, on the part of the firm, to project an accurate sales 
forecast from the SFA data was one reason this study was undertaken. Results from the study 
suggest that this is not feasible given current utilization practices by the sales force. 
Writ large, inaccurate decisions can lead to a dangerous feedback loop. As bad data 
drives bad data inferences and, in turn, bad decision-making, salespeople become even more 
likely to disregard insights developed from this data as out of touch and an obstacle to “real” 
selling (Speier and Venkatesh 2002). Under the Technology Acceptance Model and its variants, 
reductions in perceived usefulness are likely to result in reduced behavioral intent to use and then 
less actual use (Avlonitis and Panagopoulos 2005, Davis 1986, Davis and Venkatesh 2000). 
However, where use of the system is required by managerial practice but accuracy is not audited, 
we suggest that salespeople may substitute increased opportunistic utilization for declines in 
overall hard measures of usage.  
 
(Figure 6 about here.) 
  
 
 
Over an entire sales force, it is possible that this may spiral out of control. As the picture 
formed by the data in the SFA system bears less and less resemblance to the actual “truth on the 
ground”, the insights and managerial decisions that spring from them become less relevant to 
actual conditions in the field and less likely to make a positive difference. In this situation, if 
analysts continue to ignore issues of data integrity, accuracy of data will decline still further.  
This is reminiscent of the (possibly apocryphal) story of Gregory Potemkin (Sully 2007). 
Appointed by Catherine the Great to administer Russia’s Crimean territories, the story goes that 
Potemkin proved to be an incompetent administrator. To protect his position he sent glowing 
reports of his successes to her. When the Empress decided to visit the region, Potemkin 
supposedly erected a vast deception along her travel route: fake villages populated with paid 
  
servants posing as happy, productive peasants. The successful deception entrenched Potemkin’s 
power and position, ensuring that his failed management policies would be perpetuated.  
Similarly, each wave of managerial decision-making, tainted by its basis in bad data, 
creates a perverse incentive for employees subjected to these decisions to taint the data still 
further. Thus opportunistic utilization has both a direct and an indirect negative effect on the 
quality of insights derived from the SFA system.  
This was observed in the firm studied. While the VP in the focal firm had the theoretical 
authority to resolve this conflict, frequent reshuffling of the top management team limited the 
executive’s ability to mediate between organizational functions. The senior VPs of Sales relied 
on the analytics team for advice and internal intelligence; this gave the analytics team strong 
internal influence over official policy. However, ultimately the success of management was 
grounded in objective sales outcomes and in turn measured the sales team primarily on their 
ability to achieve these outcomes.   
Over time, the sales organization became divided between data analysts and the sales 
force they analyzed. Analysts were perceived as intrusive and out of touch, periodically issuing 
policies and processes for selling which were perceived as having little to do with the real issues 
salespeople faced and which were either given pro forma acceptance or outright ignored. 
Salespeople, for their part, were perceived as not seeing the “big picture”, and being unruly and 
unwilling to follow policy. The central tension in the analysis role stemmed from the fact that on 
one hand, their positions relied on their ability to justify the value of their insights to 
management. On the other hand, analysts recognized that data integrity was a problem. 
Ultimately efforts to enforce data integrity or even measure it were deferred into an indefinite 
future.   
  
Instead, analysts focused on decisions that could be measured and implemented within 
the context of the IS system itself, with the fewest possible disruptions to organizational politics. 
For example, analysts were highly interested in determining the optimum number of steps to 
include in their sales process to maximize revenue; however, from the tens of thousands of sales 
opportunities over the six years since the SFA system was implemented, analysts were unable to 
produce even a single example of a sales opportunity that had been pursued to completion 
according to their process. 
This became especially true given the perception by salespeople that the analytics group 
was aloof and naive about the day to day realities of the salespeople. That is, salespeople 
justified their opportunistic utilization by pointing to perceived poor decision-making that 
stemmed from the system, when those decisions were based on bad data resulting from earlier 
opportunistic utilization.  
Systems Acceptance 
Under the TAM, perceived utility is a critical driver of overall behavior intent to use as 
well as actual utilization of the system (Ahearne, Hughes, and Schillewaert 2007). When 
widespread cynicism about the value of the SFA system becomes entrenched in a firm, it is 
likely that the system will be misused or not used at all. The consequences for the overall 
acceptance of the system itself are likely to be negative (Avlonitis and Panagopoulos 2004). In 
turn, this can also have the effect of degrading their individual sales performance (Ahearne et al. 
2007).  
Thus one can have a seemingly paradoxical situation where there is heavy utilization of a 
system which is not accepted by its users. The users consider the system a forum to fulfilling 
procedural requirements and conducting impression management. While systems acceptance was 
  
not measured in this study, the view has strong precedent in the literature on technology 
acceptance in general and adoption of salesforce automation in particular (Davis 1989, Moutot 
and Bascoul 2008). What makes opportunistic utilization different is the stark contrast between a 
firm’s employees using a system and the firm itself deriving benefit from the system.  
Limitations and Further Research 
There are a myriad of ways in which data can be presented opportunistically. This study 
demonstrates two particular cases of demand effects in SFA quantitatively-- one each of 
misreporting of data and failure to report data. It also examines reports from within a focal firm 
qualitatively to elucidate the process by which opportunistic utilization occurs, is justified, and 
even becomes systematized.  
However, there is no reason to conclude that these two examples are the limits of 
possibility for lies of omission and commission in IS utilization, even in just the context of 
salesforce automation. SFA tools are designed to manage and record activity pertaining to lead 
generation, prospecting, qualification, customer relationships, pre-sales support, RFP and other 
formal documentation, contract negotiation, and fulfillment. Events at any of these points might 
potentially be impactful on a salesperson’s career, and thus provide an incentive for opportunistic 
behavior in their reporting, especially considering the general opacity of salesperson behavior to 
direct observation by managers. Further research is necessary to identify and determine the 
relative importance of different ways in which opportunistic utilization can manifest.  
Additionally, quantifying the magnitude of opportunistic utilization in a sales force, 
mapping the manner in which this behavior spreads through the sales force, and determining its 
impact on profitability are all avenues for further exploration of this area. In particular, since 
governing and monitoring mechanisms are not without costs of their own-- direct and indirect-- 
  
measuring its impact on profitability will help frame the cost-benefit tradeoff more clearly. 
Finally, there is a need to determine what governance mechanisms are best suited to ensuring 
that use of an information system remains use-as-intended.  
One challenge in conducting a study of deceptive data entry practices is that the principal 
data source -- the IS system -- is itself suspect. This has been supplemented with interviews with 
various members of the organization. The findings in this study are grounded primarily in 
qualitatively assessed inconsistencies between policy and reported results. In particular, detecting 
unreported selling activities is challenging; our findings very strongly impugn the plausibility of 
the salesperson reports as a whole without definitively falsifying any report in particular. 
Regarding the third policy, that of forecast fulfillment, one must also distinguish between 
intentional deception and the normal over-optimism that is natural and even productive in a 
salesperson.  
Further research can help address this. For example, a company with several overlapping 
but unconnected IS systems might provide the opportunity to contrast salesperson 
representations of their activity in different contexts. For example, reconciling customer 
opportunity records in the SFA database with expense reports submitted for reimbursement 
might illuminate cases where customers were being pursued offline. Attempts were made to 
secure this data; however, they proved unsuccessful.  
Additionally, while this study identifies the phenomenon of opportunistic utilization, it 
does not determine the boundary conditions under which it operates. A better understanding of 
the drivers of opportunistic utilization and its relationship to use-as-intended and other variables 
in the technology acceptance model would help practitioners to minimize its effects. While this 
paper explores the potential outcomes associated with it, more detailed investigation of its 
  
consequences to the salespeople, the sales force, other organizational constituencies, and the 
organization as a whole would help elucidate the consequences of opportunistic utilization of the 
IS system on the operation of the organization. In particular, interviews suggested a tense power 
dynamic between the sales force and the analytics group-- one not present between the sales 
force and the sales/finance planning manager. A multi-firm study would permit contrasts to be 
drawn between different sets of tacit norms regarding system use.  
Implications for Research Methods 
From a research perspective, these results indicate that secondary data -- even from a 
firm’s own SFA systems must be viewed with at least some degree of healthy skepticism when 
there appears to be widespread missing data or salesperson gaming of the system. Too often, it is 
assumed that secondary data is accurate and complete when that may not be the case. 
Unfortunately, our findings indicate that data may be entered in an SFA or CRM system in a 
manner that is less than accurate or fails to be forthcoming with all details. In cases such as this 
there is very limited value in the information for either management or researchers. 
Researchers seeking to derive insights from salesforce automation system data must be 
especially sensitive to the possibility of opportunistic utilization. Where this data is audited 
externally (through connections to other systems, directly measured from behavior, or subject to 
after-the-fact review), the potential for opportunistic utilization is comparatively low. Where the 
opportunity for deception is high, or where the incentive structure rewards opportunistic 
utilization, the reliability of the data should be called into serious question. Absent effective data 
integrity measures, salesforce automation data fields are self-report records presented in the 
context of very strong demand effects by informants trained in impression management tactics.  
 
  
Conclusion 
Salesforce automation systems offer a useful window into salesperson behavior and are a 
crucial tool in modern salesforce management. However, this research suggests that not all use of 
a system is use-as-intended, and data from such a system should not necessarily be taken at face 
value. Salespeople can and will be selective in what they choose to disclose to their managers via 
the system. Researchers and sales managers alike should be alert to the incentive structure that 
SFA users operate within to ensure that the system reflects actual realities in the field. Failure to 
do so has potential implications for the sales force, the success of the information system, and the 
organization itself.  
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An Escalation of Commitment Perspective on Allocation-of-Effort Decisions in Professional 
Selling 
Abstract 
Sales force compensation theory assumes that, given proper design of the incentive structure, a 
professional salesperson will rationally allocate effort to maximize returns to their firm and to 
themselves.    Some sales opportunities however may never reach a definitive end. Faced with a 
large sunk investment in long selling cycles and prior qualification decisions, salespeople 
escalate their commitment to these “zombie” opportunities, to the exclusion of pursuing viable 
leads.   This over-investment effect regarding prospects who may never be closed is explored on 
a theoretical level, and then tested empirically using three distinct types of sales effort 
investment. The effect is tested in a study of a large multinational corporation’s industrial sales 
force, for both a product and a service. Results indicate that an escalation effect does occur when 
the investment is not subject to prior managerial consent.  Results suggest that without targeted 
managerial intervention, sales executives will over-invest precious selling resources into 
unprofitable, unwinnable “zombie” opportunities.  
  
  
Introduction 
Few jobs present more governance challenges to a manager than managing a sales force. Outside 
salespeople in an industrial setting operate remotely, usually unobserved by their managers, and 
in a fluid and highly idiosyncratic environment (Albers 1995; Anderson and Oliver 1987). Sales 
research has prescribed that salespeople employ behaviors that are highly adaptive to a 
customer’s unique needs and requirements (Jones et al. 2005a; Spiro and Weitz 1990; Sujan et 
al. 1994; Weitz 1981; Weitz 1986). This leaves managers, attempting to maximize the 
performance of their employees, dependent on aligning their employees’ incentives with those of 
the firm and trusting that, whatever the salesperson actually does will rationally pursue firm 
objectives (Ouchi 1979). In service of this objective, sales scholars have supplied ever more 
sophisticated compensation structures, designed to more precisely marry the salesperson’s goals 
to the firm’s. Given that alignment, we assume managers and salespeople will work rationally, 
perform optimally, and accomplish firm objectives (Ouchi 1979). 
The question is, does this assumption hold? Behavioral research demonstrates repeatedly that 
decision-makers are subject to systematic biases, which can cause them to sub-optimize, despite 
their best efforts. One such bias is escalation of commitment. Given a long-term, risky venture in 
which significant and unrecoverable prior investments have been made, the natural human 
tendency is to over-estimate the project’s value to the organization and the need to continue 
investing when rationally they should abandon it (Staw 1981; Staw and Ross 1978).  
Escalation of commitment bias is highly relevant for industrial salespeople. Facing long sales 
cycles, significant investments of time and firm resources to win each customer, and highly risky 
outcomes, the common assumption in sales scholarship that the effort-outcome relationship is 
  
always positive cannot be sustained. Instead, we must adopt a richer view of salesperson 
cognitions regarding the selling process.  
This study explores and tests the effort-outcome relationship in two different industrial 
categories: a high tech, high-dollar industrial capital equipment product and a suite of 
customized IT services. Using observational data gleaned from archival records of selling 
activities, we hypothesize that the effort-outcome relationship is more complex than previously 
suspected, and is subject to a continuance bias that causes salespeople to over-invest in deals that 
should have been qualified out much earlier. We also suspect, however, that the nature of this 
over-investment is contingent on both governance of the resource and the product/service 
context.  
Our research examines the possibility that while opportunities can be won or lost, a third, far 
more pernicious type of outcome exists: the sales cycle which never reaches a definitive end. 
Like the mindless, shambling zombie hordes of cinema, these deals are neither alive nor dead. 
Though they are unlikely to ever be won, yet, somehow in the salesperson’s cognition still are 
seen as somehow viable.  These “zombie” sales opportunities persist in the pipeline as a constant 
drag on effort and attention. Our results suggest that without periodic managerial review, 
salesperson will sub-optimally allocate their own and their firm’s limited selling resources, that 
this result persists regardless of the salesperson’s actual ability, and that this bias afflicts both 
sales executives and their managers. 
This research contributes to the sales management literature by demonstrating that the decision-
making process driving effort allocation is far richer and more complex than heretofore realized 
in the sales force literature.  It suggest that how a salesperson perceives and processes 
information from their environment is as important as the alignment of their motivations in their 
  
decision-making.  Further findings from this study may help drive additional research efforts on 
the effectiveness of management oversight of salesperson behavior in outside sales settings. ON 
a practical level, this research reinforces the importance of qualification of customers in general.  
However, since escalation of commitment strikes salespeople, their managers, and even 
disinterested observers who have not been specifically primed to incorporate these effects into 
the decision-making, it also raises the need for selling organizations to craft oversight strategies 
that deal specifically with escalation.  In some organizations that may be incorporated into 
practice in the form of a review by an outside manager regarding the use of demonstrations 
and/or the inclusion of a technical sales-team into the sales effort for a specific account. 
Account.Background 
Sales Force Compensation 
Sales compensation theory revolves around the insight that, in a B2B context, the sales task is 
both idiosyncratic across opportunities and largely unobservable. Therefore, behavior-based 
organizational controls alone are inappropriate for maximizing performance. Instead, the 
conclusion of the sales compensation literature is that outcome-based controls can be crafted to 
align the salesperson’s motivations with those of his organization (Anderson and Oliver 1987; 
Bergen et al. 1992). Drawing on agency theory, the idea is that the salesperson will rationally 
pursue her/his self-interest. Given proper motivation, the salesperson’s motives can be aligned  
with those of their firm, and they can, therefore, be given great autonomy in deciding which 
prospects to pursue and what selling activities to employ (Coughlan and Sen 1989; Misra et al. 
2005). This assumption forms the foundation not just for traditional salary/commission 
decisions, but also for the decision to insource/outsources the sales function (e.g. Anderson 
  
1985), shifting of compensation structures during a new product release cycle , and employing 
motivational events such as sales contests (Lim et al. 2009).  
The effort-to-outcome relationship is a foundational assumption of the sales performance 
literature.  Yet, research exploring the nature of this relationship is actually relatively sparse.  
Exceptions largely consist of studies of pharmaceutical detailing such as those by Parsons and 
Abeele (1981), Manchanda and Chintagunta (2004), and Mizik and Jacobson (2004). Brown and 
Peterson (1994) examine the linear aspect of the link meta-analytically as part of a larger 
exploration of both variables’ relationships to Job Satisfaction. However, in the main, the 
literature has primarily focused on how to align incentives to best influence motivation rather 
than behavior. Studies of effort expenditure mainly apply expectancy theory (e.g. Simintiras et 
al. 1996; Teas and McElroy 1986) and agency theory (e.g. Coughlan and Sen 1989; Misra et al. 
2005). Effort itself is typically expressed as having two key dimensions: working hard and 
working smart (Sujan et al. 1994). The latter concept concedes that the elasticity of outcome with 
respect to effort varies across salespeople. This is considered tantamount to an “effectiveness 
coefficient”—one conceptualization of ability. Working smart is usually treated as a salesperson-
level construct rather than a contingent factor (e.g. the use of self-efficacy by Sujan et al. 
(1994)). Coughlan and Sen (1989) suggest developing models which support within-salesperson 
variation across product lines and time, but supply no theoretical conditions that might govern 
such variability.  
A positive but decreasing marginal return on effort perspective makes perfect sense. On the other 
hand, a negative marginal return on effort has never been contemplated. After all, what 
employee, appropriately motivated, would expend personal and firm resources to reduce their 
  
return? And yet the notion of escalating commitment suggests that in practice this is precisely 
what may happen in some situations.  
Escalation of commitment 
Escalation of commitment refers to the tendency of decision-makers, when faced with a continue 
/ abandon decision, to incorporate sunk costs into the project calculation (Staw 1981). Rational 
economic reasoning argues that unrecoverable sunk costs should not be considered—they are 
spent and now gone, whether the project is successful or not (Whyte 1986). However, in 
practice, these sunk costs often are considered, causing the decision-maker to “throw good 
money after bad” and continue with projects which are likely to fail. The decision-maker 
becomes trapped by their prior commitments and unable to escape a losing situation.  
As an empirical regularity, escalation of commitment is extremely well-supported; see Brockner 
(1992), or more recent reviews as part of Schmidt and Calatone (2002) and Kadous and Sedor 
(2004). Over nearly four decades of application across a wide variety of academic disciplines, 
the principle has proven to be a robust statement of an inherent cognitive bias.   However, while 
the behavioral regularity itself is not in doubt, the underlying mechanism by which it operates 
remains controversial. A number of potential theoretical explanations have been proposed; these 
tend to fall into two broad categories: psychological and behavioral economics approaches.  
Psychological approaches attribute biases in the assessment of sunk costs and continuation 
decisions to a variety of affective processes, and date back to pioneering work by Staw (Staw 
1981; Staw and Ross 1978). These relate to how the mind selectively processes information. A 
continuance decision is not made in a vacuum.  At the time of a decision, prior decisions to 
continue have already been made based on a belief that continuance is justified. When presented 
with new information, the decision-maker examines these in light of this positive prior belief, 
  
and focuses their attention on belief-consistent information to the exclusion of belief in-
consistent information (Frey 1986; Sanbonmatsu et al. 1998).   Several underlying causal factors 
have been proposed to explain this behavior.  These include attempts at self-justification, social 
norms enforcing consistency, negative affect (Wong et al. 2006) and avoidance of negative 
emotions associated with regret (Wong and Kwong 2007).The behavioral economics approach, 
proposed by Whyte (1986), draws on prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and 
cognitive framing as the driver of the escalation effect. Attuned to the pre-existing investment 
already made in a project, the decision-maker sets a reference point at their pre-project status, 
framing the invest/abandon decision as a choice between a sure loss (that is, the abandonment of 
the unrecoverable and already-invested sunk cost) and a risky bet (continuation of the 
investment, with a low probability of success). In this case, the prospect theory interpretation 
suggests that risk-seeking behavior will result and the decision-maker will sustain investment 
long beyond the point of rationality (Whyte 1986). 
In pursuit of a better understanding of these theoretical questions, researchers have devoted 
considerable effort to attempting to establish the effect’s boundary conditions (e.g. Arkes and 
Hutzel 2000; Beeler and Hunton 1997; Fox et al. 2009). In his seminal review of the extant 
literature at the time, Brockner (1992) suggested that the escalation effect was the result of a 
confluence of multiple simultaneous effects that are mutually reinforcing and lead to an effect 
that is robust across many decision-making contexts. Subsequent inquiry seems to support 
Brockner’s proposal, and demonstrates that the escalation effect is both robust and pervasive in 
decision-making. In particular, subsequent experimental research has shown that escalation 
effects ares present even when the decision-maker is not personally vested in the outcome of the 
decision, must explain a rational justification for their decision, or is reviewing the decisions of 
  
others (Kadous and Sedor 2004). Indeed, simply priming the decision-maker with the goal of 
dispassionately analyzing the continuance decision may actually exacerbate the escalation effect 
(Wong et al. 2008). On the bright side, Kadous and Sedor (2004) have found that sunk cost 
biases can be minimized when a third party reviewer is primed with the task objective of 
evaluating continuance against losses due to escalation.  
This study does not attempt to resolve the controversy surrounding causal mechanisms. Instead, 
it applies the effect, as has it been established in the prior literature, to propose that our 
understanding of the sales force is incomplete without incorporating the biases of salespeople 
and sales managers in pipeline management, while being agnostic as to the underlying 
mechanism driving these behavioral biases. The results have implications for the routines and 
processes of sales managers, extending from compensation to periodic pipeline reviews and IT 
policy.  
Hypotheses 
A salesperson is tasked with establishing profitable relationships with customers, which manifest 
as a series of transactions. (Anderson and Narus 1990; Palmatier et al. 2006). The sales person 
does not know, ex ante, whether a given potential customer relationship will be consummated; 
hence the need for prospecting (selecting customers to pursue) and qualifying (determining 
which opportunities justify continued investment of effort in pursuing).  This is required because 
salespeople are continually evaluated on a number of fronts relative to their performance 
(Jackson, Schlacter, and Wolfe 1995)   
The continuance decision-making process is a case of portfolio management. A salesperson 
maintains a pipeline (or funnel) of sales opportunities at varying levels of completion. Advancing 
the customer through the sales process requires an investment of effort. “Effort” may manifest as 
  
personal investments by a salesperson such as emails, teleconferences, in-person dialogues and 
presentations (Marshall et al. 1999). This investment might manifest as team-level investments 
of additional personnel to the selling effort  (Hutt et al. 1985; Johnston and Bonoma 1981). Or it 
may take the form of an organization-level investment such as: product demonstrations, 
customized pre-sale services, pilot programs, or customer-specific product development.  
Viewed as a portfolio, the problem seems straightforward enough. Given alignment of the 
salesperson’s motives with that of the selling organization, the sales person simply estimates the 
optimum allocation of selling resources required to maximize the return on their pipeline.  
Alternatively, this can be expressed as a disutility-for-utility exchange, as with Coughlan and 
Sen (1989). Where the net present value of expected future cash flows for a customer after 
accounting for cost of sale is negative, the customer is qualified out (analogous to being divested 
from the portfolio).  
Whether substantive or perceptual, only information which affects the NPV of the customer will 
influence the anticipated benefit of applying a particular selling activity to a particular customer 
in this neat and tidy view of selling effort. However, another perspective for the salesperson is to 
view each sales opportunity independently, as a series of multistage, long-term projects with 
uncertain outcomes, which require continuing investment of personal, team, and organizational 
resources. In this context, the sales opportunity is ripe for problems of escalation of commitment.  
The invest/abandon decision for sales prospects rests on the anticipated likelihood of winning the 
sale, the benefits (compensation) that will accrue from winning, and the cost in time and 
resources required to win. The cost of a sale can be effectively reduced on a per-opportunity 
basis in cases where the same effort advances multiple opportunities. One example of this is 
making a substantial customer acquisition effort that can be costed out longitudinally over a 
  
multiple transaction relationship, as in Mizik and Jacobsen (2004), where detailing visits by 
pharmaceutical reps provided same-period and subsequent benefits in prescriptions.  
Holding all other factors constant, according to this NPV-based decision-making process:  
1. Opportunities with a high probability of closing are more valuable than those with a 
lower probability of closing.  
2. Higher-revenue opportunities are more valuable than lower-revenue opportunities.  
3. Low cost-of-sale opportunities are more valuable than high cost-of-sale opportunities.  
4. Opportunities which are anticipated to require fewer time periods to close are more 
valuable than those which will require more time to close.  
At every time period, the salesperson has a chance to make an invest-or-abandon decision, based 
on their revised estimate of the probability of closing the deal. According to escalation of 
commitment theory, in cases where this information is negative, that is the information suggests 
that the transaction will not be consummated, the salesperson will have a bias towards 
discounting the negative information and continuing to invest in a losing sales cycle (Staw and 
Ross 1978).  
The actual, latent win probabilities remain unobservable, even to disinterested third parties and 
the prospects themselves. However, across a portfolio, this effect manifests as a tendency to 
over-invest in low-value sales opportunities. Since selling effort requires investment of finite 
resources, this over-investment comes at the expense of under-investment in higher value sales 
opportunities. This misallocation of resources can be examined through an ex post analysis of 
opportunities which are subsequently won or lost (and whose latent state has been revealed). In 
general, we can expect salespeople suffering from an escalation effect to over-invest in accounts 
which are subsequently lost.  
  
Investments of time 
The selling cycle requires continuing investment of the salesperson’s most elemental and scarce 
resource – time. For B2B account executives, this decision is made autonomously by the 
salesperson (Albers 1995). Salespeople must decide between continuing to meet with a given 
customer to pursue a sale with them, or to discontinuing pursuit of that customer entirely.  A 
middle ground, maintaining infrequent “maintenance” contact, requires a continuing investment 
as well, albeit much lower than for a customer being aggressively pursued.  For the purposes of 
this study, the go/no-go decision is dichotomized because even customers in maintenance mode 
require continuing investment of salesperson time and attention resources. Sales cycles which 
push closure further out into the future are not merely more expensive on the front-end, they are 
less lucrative on the back end due to the time value of money.  
However, opposing this tendency is the nature of the escalation effect. When a large prior 
investment of time into the sales process has been made, a salesperson develops relationships 
and empathy with the prospect (Palmatier et al. 2006). As they qualify the customer, their 
knowledge of the customer’s likelihood to buy might become more calibrated (Jolson 1988), but 
it also becomes less salient in the face of the large sunk cost made to earn the customer’s 
business. Attention is disproportionately awarded to information which supports their prior belief 
that a customer is winnable (Jonas et al. 2001), and which enables them to defer the anticipated 
cognitive dissonance associated with abandoning the effort. Salespeople also customarily 
participate in regular pipeline review meetings with their managers—often in conjunction with 
their peers in the same sales district. As they publicly defend their own decision-making, their 
own sense of self-efficacy becomes bound to the success of an account based on the investment 
made in pursuing it, regardless of its actual likelihood to close (Arkes and Hutzel 2000). Finally, 
  
the salesperson frames the invest/abandon decision as a sure loss versus a chance for either loss 
or gain -- treating the unrecoverable time investment as still relevant to the continuance decision 
(Whyte 1986).  
The result is that the salesperson will be more likely to continue to make investments of time in a 
sales cycle, even when the customer is unlikely to buy. Up to a certain point, the effort-outcome 
relationship should be positive, per extant theory (Brown and Peterson 1994). Salespeople 
should, rationally, discontinue investing effort when this relationship becomes negative. 
However, in practice, salespeople may escalate their commitment long after the marginal return 
on their effort is negative.  
It is worth examining the customer’s role in this process. Sometimes, the customer will assist the 
salesperson in this pruning process by simply telling the salesperson that the sales opportunity 
has been lost. Often, this is when a competitor has been selected, or when the customer 
definitively decides not to buy. While the possibility of earning revenue has been eliminated, the 
certainty at least allows the salesperson to re-allocate his effort towards other customers. 
However, customers are not always this forthcoming. Customers often employ deception 
towards salespeople from whom they have decided not to buy. In addition, customers themselves 
sometimes lose control of their buying cycle due to organizational procrastination, analysis 
paralysis, or “escalation of indecision” (Denis et al. 2011). Whatever the cause in a particular 
case, sales which cannot be won but are not definitively lost are candidates to become zombie 
sales opportunities—opportunities which continue to be pursued and so become a chronic, 
persistent drag on the salesperson’s selling resources. Thus, the greatest time investments go not 
to the sales opportunities with the highest probability of success or the highest potential revenue, 
but to these open-ended zombie sales cycles, which will, in all likelihood, not be won.  
  
H1A  Ceteris paribus, time investment by the sales person should have an inverted U-shaped 
relationship with the likelihood of winning the sales opportunity.  
Note that this is not simply a story about diminishing marginal returns on effort, already well-
known (Coughlan and Sen 1989). The point where the marginal effectiveness of an additional 
month’s time investment is expected to drop below zero should be well within the range of actual 
sales cycle times observed in a salesperson’s pipeline.  
One factor which could potentially moderate this effect is that of salesperson ability. Ability to 
recognize and abandon selling efforts towards customers who are unlikely to buy is a part of the 
qualification process competency(Jolson 1988). While sales ability is highly complex and 
derives from many different competencies, superior salespeople should be better equipped to 
optimally allocate their efforts, if for no other reason because less effective salespeople will 
underperform and be selected out of the work pool. Moreover, highly-able salespeople can be 
expected to have larger, richer pipelines; with more lucrative prospects in the offing, there should 
be less resistance to abandoning a suspect and long-simmering deal (Fox et al. 2009). Therefore,  
H1B Salesperson ability moderates the time investment to win probability relationship, such 
that higher-ability salespeople have stronger positive time-to-win probability 
relationships and  weaker sales atrophy effects.  
The consequence of this effect is the pipeline sclerosis effect. Opportunities are posited to attrite 
out of the salesperson’s pipeline unevenly: while customers who impose a buy or no buy 
decision in effect qualify themselves, customers which do not reach a decision must be qualified 
by the salesperson, who can fail to do so due to escalation of commitment. Certain victories and 
defeats attrite out, but zombie opportunities persist. In this way, a pipeline gradually accumulates 
a collection of these opportunities. Therefore, the effectiveness (that is, return on time 
  
investment) across the entire portfolio of prospective customers should decline and eventually 
become negative. Hence,  
H1C Salespeople with highly sclerotic pipelines will have lower performance than those with 
lower levels of pipeline sclerosis.  
Investments of Personnel 
Time is not the only resource that a B2B salesperson has at his command. In a team selling 
environment, salespeople have the capability to call on additional personnel resources from the 
company. One such investment is the technical salesperson. Technical salespeople (also called 
pre-sales technical support, sales engineers, or subject-matter experts) are product experts who 
are trained in selling techniques  (Bellizzi and Cline 1985). Under the direction of the account 
executive, they liaise with the prospect’s technical team, answer specialized questions, develop 
customer-specific prototypes and proofs of concept, and (in the case of customized services) 
conduct pre-sale requirements gathering. This adds significantly to the cost of sale (in the form 
of costs such as time, travel and entertainment expenses). (Johnston and Marshall 2013; Jones et 
al. 2005b)   
Investments of Operations Resources 
A final type of escalating investment by a salesperson is the on-site product demonstration. The 
actual cost of a product demo in high-dollar B2B markets can be very high, involving the 
creation of custom product development, professional services, customer-specific integration 
work, as well as the shipping, maintenance and configuration of hardware.  
Costly investments such as manpower and prototypes/demonstrations should rationally occur in 
cases where the sale will convert a losing opportunity into a winning one (Dubinsky and Ingram 
1984).  Where an opportunity would be won or lost regardless of the support personnel added to 
  
the effort, the marginal benefit is zero and the technical salesperson is not 
employed/demonstration not scheduled. Following this logic, one would expect to see a strong 
positive relationship between these investments and likelihood of winning. However, the logic of 
escalation of commitment suggests the opposite. Salespeople facing a losing deal will begin 
escalating their commitment, diverting selling resources to losing propositions to “rescue” them 
(and therefore, their own self-image, social standing, and the sunk costs already invested).  
H2 Sales opportunities that have had sales engineers engaged for the sales team are less 
likely to be won than sales opportunities for which a sales engineer has not been added due to the 
escalation of commitment effect.    
H3 Sales opportunities that have had an on-site demonstration are less likely to be won than 
sales opportunities for which such a demo has not been conducted due to the escalation of 
commitment effect.   
Method 
Data 
The data analyzed came from over 5000 sales opportunities pursued across the United States by 
a high tech industrial products manufacturer. The data follows a cohort of sales opportunities 
opened within a one year period and studied over a period of three years. As this kind of data is 
relatively rare in a study of this nature, an extended description is merited.  
Salespeople working for this company pursue sales opportunities within their regionally-assigned 
territories. Sales teams are used to supplement sales representatives’ own skills with subject 
matter expertise, specialist knowledge in particular product lines, and as general supplements in 
national accounts—all under the direction of the account executive, who manages the 
  
opportunity and makes resource allocation decisions. Deal sizes examined in the data range from 
over a hundred thousand US dollars to contracts of several millions of dollars; revenue is 
distributed approximately log-normally. Turnover of sales personnel is approximately 15% 
during the study period.  
Sales cycle length varies significantly, following an approximate log-normal distribution. A 
typical sales cycle is completed (win or lose) within a year. Opportunities have been pursued by 
this company for as long as six years or more; however, only six  percent of those studied had 
not reached some resolution by the end of the study.  
Business-to-business transactions often occur within the context of a continuing relationship. 
Indeed, forty-seven percent of sales opportunities for the firm are with an existing customer.   
The typical transaction frequency is approximately five years. As an industrial product with a 
very long service lifetime, this should not be surprising.  
Leads are generated in two ways. The marketing department develops leads from web site 
inquiries, trade shows, and purchased lists. The salespeople also develop and pursue their own 
leads. Salespeople have broad latitude to interact with the prospect as they see fit. In addition to 
their own time, travel, and expenses, salespeople can also add a technical salesman to the team. 
This role conducts technical presentations, collects technical requirements, and performs pre-sale 
technical support. The vast majority of the opportunities which utilize technical sales people are 
in the services category (75%); comparatively few product sales opportunities use them (7%).  
Sales persons can also choose to arrange a demonstration. Demonstrations require thousands of 
dollars to ship and install equipment, and to develop software prototypes. These are used much 
less frequently than are technical salespeople. 
  
SFA systems 
The data itself comes from a sales force automation system (SFA) (Erffmeyer and Johnson 2001; 
Hunter and Perreault Jr 2007). These programs are used by the firm supplying the data to 
manage global sales representatives operating autonomously in pursuit of long-term, highly 
complex sales opportunities. The SFA system tracks a variety of data relating to a salesperson’s 
activities in relation to their account base.  The system tracks the individual opportunity, the 
account it is associated with, and all activities reported by the salesperson in pursuit of the 
opportunity. Fields reported are the date when the opportunity is opened (and, if applicable, 
closed), the forecast revenue, product category, sales cycle length, selling activities pursued, 
current stage in the sales cycle, whether or not the sale was closed, and unique identifiers for 
members of the sales team associated with the account. Cost and margin data were not available.  
To study the applicability of the model in product versus service contexts, opportunities in two 
product categories were studied. One is industrial machinery (typical cost ranges from around 
$100,000 to over $1,000,000), and the other is professional IT services delivered by the same 
organization (average cost approximately $400,000 though it can run to over $1,000,000).  
Sales people are assigned to work in teams on an ad-hoc basis for each opportunity. That is, 
rather than using a standing sales team for multiple opportunities, personnel such as technical 
salespeople are assigned on an as-needed basis to individual opportunities. Technical salespeople 
are drawn from a regional pool; any technical salesperson might be assigned to work with any 
account executive in his region.  
demand effects  
Nearly all the data in the system is recorded by members of the sales team, typically the account 
executive himself. This kind of data is self-reported, rather than behavioral data, despite the fact 
  
that it is derived from a managerial control system. As noted above, salespeople tend to operate 
with a high degree of autonomy (and the focal firm is no exception). Sales managers have only a 
few windows available to them to monitor their employees, and the SFA system is an important 
one.  
Such a system necessarily has strong demand effects; researchers, like managers, must apply a 
critical eye to the salesperson’s representations of their pipeline and its progress. For example, 
salespeople often withhold information from their employer to protect their own unique 
knowledge and maintain their intra-organizational power (Wang et al. 2009).  Similarly, 
salespeople may attempt to maintain an information monopoly in an attempt to secure 
salesperson- rather than firm-directed loyalty from customers (Palmatier et al. 2007). For this 
reason, the variables used were selected to minimize this bias. 
The data was analyzed using binary logistic regression. The dependent variable was the log odds 
ratio of Win -- the successful or unsuccessful close of a sales opportunity. A dichotomous 
variable was chosen because the quantity of interest is the likelihood that a selling investment 
will pay off, which in turn drives the continuation decision, rather than the magnitude of the 
payoff (the size of the opportunity is controlled for below).  
The overall model is as follows: 
ln (
𝑝(𝑊𝑖𝑛)
𝑝(1 −𝑊𝑖𝑛)
) = 𝛽0 + 𝜷MainEffects𝑿MainEffects +𝜷Controls𝑿Controls + 𝜀 
Where XMainEffects is an nx5 matrix of the five predictors and the βMainEffects vector of coefficients 
corresponding to the four hypothesized relationships posited. XControls is the nx10 matrix of 
control variables, with a vector βControls of coefficients.  
There are four independent variables, representing the three hypotheses tested.  SE: Represents 
whether (1) or not (0) a Sales Engineer was added to the sales team. Inclusion of this role is the 
  
only personnel decision which is largely at the discretion of the account executive. Of the sales 
opportunities in this data set, 40.6 percent included a sales engineer.  
Demo: Represents whether (1) or not (0) a product demonstration was conducted. In this 
industry, onsite demonstrations of hardware and customer-specific prototypes of software are 
extremely expensive and logistically complex. This therefore represents a significant investment 
in the selling process. Only 1.5 percent of the opportunities studied used a demo.  
SalesCycle: The length of the sales cycle (in days). The distribution of sales cycle length is 
approximately log-normal; one is added to the sales cycle to avoid problems associated with 
taking the log of zero. A quadratic term is also included to test the hypothesized curvilinear 
relationship.  
Perform*LN(SalesCycle): Salesperson ability may moderate the relationship between sales cycle 
length and win rate. A positive significant coefficient for this control reflects the fact that more 
effective salespeople should be able to counteract their natural tendency towards bias stemming 
from escalation of commitment.  
In addition, it is necessary to control for several potentially confounding effects.  The first of 
these is opportunity size which has two components.  These two components are revenue and 
revenue*sales cycle,  
Revenue is the anticipated transaction size in dollars, as forecast by the salesperson prior to 
closure of the sale. A larger opportunity has a higher present value, despite a longer sales cycle 
length or higher risk factor. Salespeople will endure a higher risk of losing if the revenue payout 
is higher.   The second of these opportunity size constructs is  
  
 Revenue*LN(SalesCycle): This interaction term encompasses the possibility that a 
rational salesperson will elect to invest more time in a riskier account simply because it is 
worth so much. 
Marketing-Produced Leads are another form of potential confounding effects.    As in most 
companies, the sales pipeline is generated by a combination of marketing-developed sales leads 
(1) and the salesperson’s own prospecting activity (0). The quality of the former is a perennial 
source of complaint from sales organizations (Kotler et al. 2006) and might affect the ex ante 
probability of a win directly, and/or indirectly through negative attributions by the account 
executive.  
The third type of confounding effects involve the breadth of the opportunity.   A salesperson 
might over-invest in a sales cycle if he/she believes that the effort can be amortized over several 
transactions (concurrent or future).   There are four possible types of confounds in this area.  
First, the past value of the customer (that is, the total prior realized revenue in dollars from that 
customer over the previous five years) is also controlled. A salesperson might logically consider 
an account with a high PAV to be part of a continuing relationship and make sales effort 
investments based on the value of the relationship rather than the immediate transaction.   The 
second of these involves PAV*LN(SalesCycle): Past account value may also indirectly affect the 
odds of winning an opportunity by moderating the relationship between sales cycle and outcome. 
Salespeople can be expected to have greater idiosyncratic knowledge of accounts with a high 
PAV, enabling them to better calibrate their estimate of their chances of success.   Another issue 
that must be considered is whether or not the selling firm views the account as a strategic 
account.   This is coded as a dummy variable representing whether (1) or not (0) the customer 
has been identified by the company as a strategic account. While the nature of 
  
key/national/strategic account management remains somewhat hazy for practitioners, strategic 
accounts are identified by the sales leadership as being high-priority accounts deserving of 
additional attention for reasons external to a particular transaction. 15.6 percent of opportunities 
included in this study are considered strategic accounts by the firm.   Finally, the issue of 
whether the account was pursued in concert.   Accounts pursued in concert with channel partners 
(1) or not (0). A salesperson might over-invest in a channel opportunity as a way to strengthen 
the manufacturer/distributor partnership. This represents 39.6 percent of all sales opportunities 
examined in the current research.  
The final potential confounding effect involves the degree of salesperson ability.  A highly 
skilled salesperson can reasonably be expected to be able to better identify winnable accounts. 
Indeed, by process of attrition, salespeople with the best-calibrated sense of the appropriate 
investment of effort to make in a sale should be selected for.  We assessed this construct in two 
ways.   First, was the salesperson employed by the firm in the prior year? If so, they are coded a 
(1) if not (0). This would appear to be a reasonable proxy for experience with the focal firm.   
Second, we control for the account executive’s standardized prior-year performance. Since all 
salespeople in the focal firm have the same quota and market potential for their territories, this is 
used as a proxy for absolute performance.   Finally, we examine an interaction term, 
WasEmployed*Perform: An interaction term, to account for the fact that the performance 
variable does not capture salesperson ability for new hires.  
(Insert Table 1 About Here) 
The overall fit of the model against both data sets was highly significant (p < .001). For the 
product category, the Nagelkerke R2 is .246 (78.6% of cases assigned correctly), and for the 
service category, it is .228 (75.1% of cases assigned correctly). 
  
Results 
(Insert Table 2 About Here.] 
Consistent with H1A, the coefficient for the quadratic time investment term was negative for both 
the product and service category, and positive for the linear term. After an initial period where 
greater investment of time has a positive effect on sales outcomes (that is, where rational 
application of sales effort improves the odds of a positive outcome), the sales atrophy effect 
dominates and greater investments of effort are associated with lower win rates.  
This is not merely a case of diminishing returns on time investment. For both the product and the 
service categories, the point at which the return on additional sales effort becomes negative 
occurs well within the scope of a typical sales cycle (108 days for the product and 180 days for 
the service). In the figure, the dotted line indicates the breakeven point; to the left, the net effort-
outcome relationship is positive, while to the right it is negative. After the point represented by 
the dotted line, increased time investment in winning a customer actually reduces the marginal 
probability that the customer will be won.  
The interaction term that represents the moderating effect of salesperson ability on the effort-
outcome relationship was non-significant for both categories. The moderating effect of 
salesperson ability on the effort/outcome relationship proposed by H1B is not supported. This 
means that both high- and low-performing salespeople are subject to this escalation effect.  
For the next form of investment, the assignment of personnel to the opportunity (H2), results 
were mixed. Addition of a sales engineer to the sales team had no significant impact, positive or 
negative, for the product category.  Evidently for product sales, the technical salesperson is 
sometimes used effectively and other times not – but with no clear pattern of over-investment in 
trying to save the account. 
  
 For the services category, though, bringing in the additional sales team member had a highly 
significant negative effect on win rate (significant both statistically and in terms of effect size).  
It appears that in many cases involving service sales, technical salespeople were being brought in   
as a last ditch effort to rescue failing opportunities. This is in contrast to their supposed function 
of providing additional skilled/technical support as needed to provide better service to the 
potential customer and resolve any questions the client firm has regarding the product or service 
prior to sealing the deal.  
The final form of investment involves demonstrations. For both the product and the service, the 
coefficient is positive and highly significant. This falsifies H3. Demonstrations are high-
investment activities that are relatively infrequent and tightly controlled by the selling company 
to ensure that the sales opportunity justifies the significant costs associated with a demo. It 
appears that this monitoring overcomes any bias on the part of the account executive.   Further, it 
indicates that utilizing demonstrations where sales are significant and in doubt is effect ive. 
None of the moderators proposed proved to be significant. In particular, the sales atrophy effect 
was consistent regardless of job tenure or ability, and was not moderated by current or past 
transaction value. This is consistent with Sleesman, et al. (Sleesman et al. 2012), who found 
preliminary evidence for the proposition that escalation of commitment is driven primarily by 
goal substitution rather than sunk costs (Conlon and Garland 1993) 
Discussion 
Managing an outside sales force is a challenging task. Salespeople operate largely autonomously, 
and most of the available information on the status of pending opportunities is self-generated and 
self-reported. For this reason, sales compensation research prescribes aligning the motives of 
salespeople and their organization using outcome-based controls (commissions, sales contests, 
  
etc.)  (Anderson and Oliver 1987; Kalra and Shi 2001; Lim et al. 2009). However, this 
presupposes that the salesperson will rationally pursue the optimum level of investment to 
maximize their returns.  
Results suggest that a salesperson’s cognitive biases have a considerable impact on their 
decision-making with regard to allocation of effort. The traits of optimism, confidence and 
aggressiveness which are usually associated with a high-performing salesperson may actually 
hinder their strategic choices.  Surprisingly, this appears to be true regardless of the salesperson’s 
ability and experience.  
The mixed effect for H2 raises interesting questions. First, since the high statistical power 
available to study the effects makes it unlikely that this is a statistical artifact, differences in the 
way technical salespeople are employed for the two categories may help explain the 
contradictory results. In the product category studied, the flow of information is strictly one-way; 
customer-specific technical adaptations are not made. So a technical salesperson is employed 
purely as a subject matter expert in these opportunities. However, for the technical salesperson 
working on service opportunities, the selling process requires a more interactive approach. 
Technical salespeople engaged in the service sales potentially are called on to perform a wide 
range of activities such as:  assisting in requirements-gathering, development of mockups and 
prototypes, and other persuasive activities which go far beyond the role of “information 
resource” (Bellizzi and Cline 1985). As a pure subject matter expert, the ability of a technical 
salesperson to actually sway a product-category customer is limited, and therefore the temptation 
to employ them to rescue failing deals is low whereas in a service setting there is more latitude 
involved in the sales effort.  
  
H3 was clearly falsified in both product categories. Demonstrations in this industry are expensive 
affairs, requiring shipment of expensive equipment, not to mention installation, configuration 
and support for this equipment in the product category. For customized IT services, the costs are 
even higher, as working mockups and prototypes require significant development resources. For 
this reason, demos are employed sparingly and with significant managerial oversight.  Thus, 
managerial controls appear to override salesperson desires to continue to escalate the sales 
investment in these accounts.  In these very high investment decisions, the propensity to escalate 
finally meets resistance due to the high level of expense involved. With this high-investment 
decision, escalation effects are salient, and managers therefore resist escalation, an effect they are 
otherwise subject to with regard to other decisions.  
Results suggest an avenue to improve managerial practices in the face of escalation of 
commitment-driven misapplication of resources. In many cases in outside sales, the sales field is 
dominated by an emphasis on outcome-based controls because the selling process proceeds 
almost entirely unobserved. However, alignment of incentives only goes so far in the face of 
irrational tendencies on the part of the account executive. In this case, raising the stakes does 
nothing to ameliorate the tendency to double down on a losing prospect. Sleesman et al.  2012 
found a similar result for making opportunity costs salient by increasing the negative impact of 
personal investment in the decision.  However, sales force automation systems provide a new 
opportunity to monitor and manage investments in the selling process. Indeed, the H1B results 
suggest that a sense of reality is not a skill that can be trained or selected for; it requires an 
outsider’s dispassionate review for sunk cost bias to be bypassed.  
Few companies directly track the cost of sale on a per-opportunity basis. However, these results 
strongly suggest that salespeople will not effectively self-manage their allocation of selling 
  
resources. By exercising independent, critical judgment on their subordinates’ pipelines, 
managers can resolve these sclerotic pipelines by pruning dysfunctional opportunities and 
helping their salespeople apply a dispassionate eye towards losing efforts. Managers should also 
be skeptical towards proposed investments in opportunities which are dragging out—and must 
explicitly build this process of review and counter-escalation into their pipeline review process 
lest they themselves succumb to escalation effects (Kadous and Sedor 2004; McNamara et al. 
2002).  One way of accomplishing this is to determine the normal sales cycle and apply more 
stringent guidelines for allocating resources to potential deals that have lingered much longer 
than the normal time length for a sale to close.  In order to keep an account open past the typical 
time required for closing, salespeople should be required to “build a case” for why this account 
should continue to be pursued.  The longer the time past a “normal” closing date, the tougher the 
test should be for justifying continued pursuit of the specific opportunity in the account. 
Limitations and Future Research 
This study opens the conversation regarding escalation of commitment and serves as a departure 
point for further exploration of the subject. As such, it probably creates more questions than it 
answers.  A key limitation is that this study lacks profitability data on the opportunity, looking 
only at its magnitude as measured by revenue. Prior research strongly suggests that there is no 
reason to expect an association between revenue and profitability of relationships (Rangan et al. 
1992); however, in this case the use of profitability data would have defeated the purpose of 
diagnosing bias in the face of incentives because the sales force being examined is compensated 
based on revenue, not profit.  
Another limitation is the fact that time investments in an opportunity are proxied using the length 
of the sales cycle. A superior method would be to directly measure salesperson investments 
  
through measurements of customer contacts (visits, emails, phone calls) as with Manchanda and 
Chintagunta (2004). Such data was unavailable for this study; indeed, the company in question 
does not track this information on a per-opportunity or per-account basis at all. The authors’ 
experience suggests that this is typical of many sales organizations. Tracking costs of sales 
directly opens the door for a much more nuanced view of the sales cycle and superior 
management of the salesperson’s pipeline.  
After time investments, another major investment on the salesperson’s part is in the form of 
discounts and price concessions (Hansen et al. 2009; Mantrala et al. 2010). The company studied 
does not systematically track discounting behavior by salespeople.  Nevertheless, interviews with 
key informants in the firm’s finance group suggests that discounts are commonly used to rescue 
failing opportunities, or to “pull forward” opportunities likely to close in future periods to rescue 
a quota likely to be missed in the current period. While discounting behavior can be tracked by 
the accounting system for deals which have been won, it is more difficult to track unobserved 
offers made to prospects who subsequently decline. The escalation-of-commitment model 
described in this paper suggests that the discount-to-win likelihood relationship is much weaker 
than one might expect from a strict utility maximization perspective.  
The mixed results for H2 and H3 indicates that managerial involvement in the pipeline 
management process, especially for significant investments, can have a positive impact on the 
allocation of resources. A logical next step would be to conduct an experiment testing the 
efficacy of tracking cost of sale data on a per-opportunity basis, and on training sales managers 
in pipeline pruning policies to estimate what, if any, lift can be derived from a more optimal 
allocation of selling investment. Lab-based experimentation can also help to isolate specific 
factors which contribute to or ameliorate sunk cost biases in the sales context.  
  
It is one thing to determine that salespeople are subject to cognitive biases and over-invest in 
losing sales. However, this begs the question: how does one diagnose these losing sales ex ante? 
Identifying the customer- and opportunity-specific characteristics that distinguish winners from 
losers is, of course, exactly what qualification is intended to accomplish; and yet the results of 
this study suggest great potential to advance the state of the art. In particular, the proliferation of 
sales force automation applications is a sea change in sales management that provides an 
opportunity for academics to revisit the tools, routines and best practices used in the qualification 
process.  
Finally, future research can clarify other key sales outcomes. This study analyzed sales 
performance on an opportunity-level, win/lose basis due to the nature of the hypotheses being 
tested and the characteristics of the focal firm. However, the authors are not blind to the other 
key outcomes that are used to measure salespeople: revenue and profitability on the opportunity, 
relationship, and salesperson levels. This paper does not examine these factors, or organizational 
citizenship behaviors—focusing entirely on immediate opportunity-specific sales outcomes. 
Studies which look at these outcomes can help elucidate the drivers of performance.  
Conclusion 
The performance of the industrial salesperson is critical to the performance of the B2B 
organization as a whole, and yet they operate autonomously, largely unobserved by managers. 
Sales managers, driven by the associated compensation theory, have relied on salespeople to 
self-manage by aligning their incentives with those of the company as a whole. This study 
demonstrates that this alignment of incentives is not enough—the salesperson’s cognitive biases 
are a strong obstacle standing in the way of optimum behavior even for the most experienced and 
high-ability salespeople. Managerial involvement in the selling process may potentially help 
  
salespeople to identify and curtail escalating investments into losing opportunities. Our work 
suggests that new information technologies provide both the data that illustrates this effect and a 
possible avenue to greatly magnify the potential of the sales force.  
  
  
Table 1 Study Constructs and Measures 
 
Continuous Variables
Name Units Mean StDev Max Min Skew Kurt
Product
SalesCyle Days 201 264 1647 0 1.755 3.507
Revenue Dollars 191698 279059 3600000 -43875 4.519 33.80
PAV Dollars 187291 569902 10091610 -22680 8.062 92.70
Perform Standardized 0.089 0.872 3.005 -1.095 1.117 1.145
Service
SalesCyle Days 190 262 1647 0 1.858 3.988
Revenue Dollars 143281 224063 3000000 -100000 5.500 51.90
PAV Dollars 224981 1281566 43790357 -22680 28.11 935.6
Perform Standardized 0.171 0.905 4.059 -1.095 1.185 1.286
Dichotomous Variables
Name Product Service
Won (DV)
SalesEng 6.68% 74.58%
Demo 2.61% 3.41%
Marketing 7.52% 7.38%
Strategic 11.16% 16.09%
Channel 39.48% 50.90%
WasEmployed 36.80% 42.90%
  
Table 2: Regression Results
 
 
 
 
 
  
Regresssion Results
Product Service
Variable Hypothesis Coefficient exp( Β) Sig Coefficient exp( Β) Sig
Main Effects
Ln(SalesCycle) H1A: + 0.859 ** 2.361 0.000 1.009 ** 2.743 0.000
Ln(SalesCycle)2 H1A: ? -0.183 ** 0.833 0.000 -0.194 ** 0.824 0.000
Ln(SalesCycle) * Perform H1B: + -0.012 0.988 0.717 0.017 1.017 0.589
SalesEng H2: ? -0.004 0.996 0.975 -0.552 ** 0.576 0.000
Demo H3: ? 2.426 ** 11.314 0.000 1.707 ** 5.512 0.000
Controls
Revenue 0.000 ** 1.000 0.000 0.000 ** 1.000 0.001
Ln(SalesCycle) * Revenue 0.000 ** 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.147
Marketing -2.071 ** 0.126 0.001 -0.890 ** 0.411 0.018
PAV 0.000 ** 1.000 0.002 0.000 ** 1.000 0.005
Ln(SalesCycle) * PAV 0.000 1.000 0.416 0.000 1.000 0.176
Strategic 0.774 ** 2.168 0.000 0.386 * 1.471 0.020
Channel 0.259 1.296 0.066 0.297 * 1.346 0.026
WasEmployed 0.271 1.311 0.219 0.083 1.087 0.696
Perform 0.232 1.261 0.373 0.209 1.232 0.478
WasEmployed * Perform -0.196 0.822 0.484 -0.380 0.684 0.208
Diagnostics
(Constant) -1.072 0.342 0.000 -0.572 0.564 0.007
# Observations 1568 1436
Χ215 278.803 0.000 249.521 0.000
Nagelkerke R2 0.246 0.228
Cases Correctly Assigned 78.60% 75.10%
p < 0.05*  p < 0.01**
  
Figure 1:  Product Sales Cycle 
 
  
  
Figure 2:  Service Sales Cycle 
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Idiosyncrasy and Regularity: A Study of Profitability in Relationships 
Abstract 
This paper examines the value of idiosyncratic characteristics among a firm’s relationship 
partners as a means to develop advantages that cannot be easily copied or replicated by 
competing firms.  While idiosyncratic characteristics are often ignored by businesses as they 
attempt to develop models of customer behavior, this may be a mistake because consideration of 
these differences among customers and a supplier’s adaptation to those irregularities may result 
in advantages that are very valuable to both the supplying firm doing the adaptation and the 
buying organization for whom the adaptations are made.  Ways to identify and utilize the hidden 
value in these idiosyncratic behaviors are examined. Propositions are developed to guide 
research in addressing this often-overlooked business opportunity. 
Introduction 
The study of interorganizational relationships traditionally looks to regularities among 
observations to understand the drivers of profitability (e.g. Crosby, Evans and Cowles 1990; 
Samaha, Beck and Palmatier 2014).  In these studies, it is customary to ignore the  non-
repeatable aspects of business relationships—they are dismissed as outliers and singular events 
which cannot be generalized and therefore from which no valuable insights can be garnered 
(Cohen, Cohen, West and Aiken 2003 ). The purpose of this study is to challenge this idea, 
identifying idiosyncrasy, as a class, as a fruitful subject of research, and a powerful potential 
driver of sustainable competitive advantage.  
  
Several steps must be accomplished in order to clarify the role of idiosyncrasy in generating 
sustainable competitive advantage for a firm. The first of these is to define idiosyncrasy so that it 
is easily distinguished from other related concepts such as heterogeneity.  In particular the 
concept of relational rents as advanced by Dyer and Singh (1998) is very important in making 
the distinction between idiosyncrasy and heterogeneity.  Once the relationship between 
idiosyncrasy and heterogeneity has been established, previous research examining the different 
schools of thought on the drivers of profitability shall be reviewed.   
After these concepts have been contrasted, they will then be connected, showing that transaction 
specificity, as a driver of profitability, implies an idiosyncratic condition to which the 
organizations are mutually adapting.  Identifying these idiosyncratic sources of advantage 
requires a process of knowledge acquisition at the individual level by boundary-spanning 
personnel (Gonzalez, Claro, and Palmatier 2014).  The key step of knowledge acquisition is 
followed by diffusion of that information into various levels of the organization by the firms 
themselves -- a process necessarily laden in uncertainty (Tsai 2001; Flaherty et al. 2012). 
Strategies to optimize the effectiveness of the acquisition and diffusion of knowledge processes 
and the means of mitigating risks forms the basis of the perspective that idiosyncratic events are 
potentially valuable sources of profitability for a firm and may form the basis for enduring 
competitive advantage (Nissen, Evald, and Clarke 2014). 
Boundary Conditions 
In considering the impact of idiosyncrasy in relational partners, it is important to recognize the 
boundary conditions of this article. The theory of idiosyncrasy-derived relational rents centers on 
the formation of a sustainable competitive advantage, housed in an inter-organizational 
relationship, and based upon mutual partner-specific adaptation (Dyer and Singh 1998). This 
  
theory does not attempt to address the larger questions of strategic competitive advantage in 
general, or other consequences of idiosyncrasy for the firm. Nor does it address individual-level 
considerations such as salesperson performance, or general measures of relationship quality other 
than profitability. 
Idiosyncrasy 
An idiosyncrasy is a situation containing characteristics or objects of importance that are unique 
to a particular context  (Liu 2007; Lohtia et al. 2005).  For a situation to be idiosyncratic, the 
unique characteristic must not have been experienced before, and there should be no expectation 
that it will be experienced again in the future. Such observations are typically aggregated into an 
error term in statistical models (Cohen et al. 2003). Case studies and even theoretical treatments 
reject these as unrepresentative of the essential (that is, generalizable) characteristics under study 
(Eisenhardt 1989). In most cases, when an idiosyncratic situation has a strong impact on a 
parameter of interest, it is often excluded from the study altogether as an outlier because 
including it will distort the results (Donthu et al. 2005). In positivist research, where conclusions 
are to be drawn between comparable cases or to generalize to other cases, this is entirely 
appropriate.  
When looking for idiosyncrasy, a researcher must focus on characteristics which are unique to a 
particular circumstance or object of interest, and which fall outside the normal scope of variation 
between entities, analogous to the definition of an outlier as “a data point which is very different 
from the rest of the data based on some measure” (Bakar et al. 2006). For example, a researcher 
observes that the number of employees varies between companies. Looking across companies, 
one can see variation in this number, and indeed some organizations might well be unique in the 
  
precise number at some point in time, but all organizations do have some number of employees 
that can be measured. This is an example of heterogeneity.  
In contrast, Bigelow Aerospace is unique in that it is an aerospace habitat company whose senior 
leadership has extensive expertise in real estate and hospitality, as opposed to such a firm being 
led by someone with experience in aerospace, engineering, or some kind of high tech discipline 
(Sim 2015). Variation such as this could be plotted as a unique variable for which the outlier has 
one value and all other observations have another; but these data points are typically thrown out 
because by definition they are resistant to generalization (Eisenhardt 1989). This applies even 
when the possibility of a measurement error can be definitively ruled out (Cohen et al. 2003).  
However, while idiosyncratic characteristics are difficult to study individually, they can be 
examined as a class.  Further, these unusual features may be a point of differentiation that can 
lead to competitive advantage in a particular business setting.  Failing to study and/or understand 
such characteristics may result in a firm missing out on a sustainable source of advantage that 
will be difficult and/or costly for competitors to copy.  
The very factors that make insights related to idiosyncratic variation difficult to generalize 
provide the foundation of the isolating mechanisms that make these adaptations difficult for 
competitors to imitate. The resource-based view of the firm posits four preconditions for 
sustainable competitive advantage: that it be valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable 
(Barney 1991). Idiosyncrasy is by definition rare. Sustainment of an advantage also depends in 
part on its resistance to imitation by competitors. Adaptation to idiosyncratic factors resists 
imitation for two reasons related to generalizability. First, as a given type of idiosyncratic event 
is unlikely, a competitor seeking to imitate a firm’s success is unlikely to encounter a similar 
idiosyncrasy in an alternative partner, ensuring a form of path dependence. Second, because the 
  
idiosyncrasy has not been encountered and recognized in the past, a potential competitor has 
limited visibility into the details and mechanism of the adaptation, providing for causal 
ambiguity. While every relationship is rife with unique characteristics (MacNeil 1980; Dwyer, 
Shurr, and Oh 1987), the challenge for the frontline employee spanning the boundary between 
firms is to identify those idiosyncrasies in its partners which will be valuable and non-
substitutable, should the firm adapt to them successfully.  
Commensuration 
Commensuration is a cognitive and social process whereupon a quality of interest is identified, 
operationalized, and then measured, “a way to reduce and simplify disparate information into 
numbers that can easily be compared” (Espeland and Stevens 1998).   Commensuration is  a 
critical part of sense-making, where standardization is used to  make the abstract concrete. 
Commensuration regularizes insights into a form that can be communicated, as a preliminary 
step to coordination of firm activities, exertion of authority, or management of risk (Ring and 
Van de Ven 1994). In particular, the association of several observed phenomena, discarding 
some, selecting others for quantification, and then grouping them with one another through an 
underlying construct (Tuomi 1999).  
The choice of variable representing the underlying construct can be extremely important, 
because once selected it can guide subsequent decision-making and knowledge gathering (Tuomi 
1999). Once a variable has been operationalized and associated with a construct, this 
operationalization will help drive subsequent understanding of that construct. Espeland and 
Stevens (1998) provide an example of commensuration with the case of decision-making 
regarding whether or not to build a dam, based on its anticipated effects on water quality.  
  
Water quality has many dimensions (e.g. temperature, the amount and nature of 
dissolved solids, turbidity, pH), and even though these dimensions are already quantified, 
they are measured with different scales. Aggregating these attributes according to some 
broader metric creates “water quality” (Espeland and Stevens 1998, p. 317). 
Similarly, in an organizational context, when measuring a construct such as relationship quality 
rather than water quality, one can employ the same process to identify and operationalize the 
concept. Considerations such as the subjective evaluations of different actors across  the 
organizations, financial measures of outcomes, forecasts for the relationship’s future value, 
estimates of risk, relative attractiveness of alternative relationship partners, and contractual 
constraints on behavior, are all at least potentially important aspects of the quality of a 
relationship between firms (e.g. Cannon and Perreault 1999; Palmatier et al. 2006; Friend et al. 
2014).  As this latent construct is commensurated, these and other variables are selected or 
rejected, operationalized, measured, and weighed against one another so as to fully capture the 
concept of relationship quality. This may occur formally in an academic setting or intuitively 
among practitioners, but regardless it is a necessary part of operationalization.  Once the variable 
is operationalized, it can be utilized by the firm to assess the overall relationship as well as 
specific  aspects of the firm’s relationship with the partner organization.  
Heterogeneity vs. Idiosyncrasy 
While all variables are by definition subject to variation, not all variation is created equal. When 
an observer has commensurated a phenomenon, they have distilled it into a  construct that can be 
quantified and measured (Bearden, Netemeyer, and Hawes 2011) . For some variables, a 
sufficient number of observations permits the user to (implicitly or explicitly) model its variation 
and develop hypotheses regarding the relationship between that variable and other quantities of 
  
interest. This variation indicates heterogeneity across observations.   From these observations, a 
distribution can be found that fits its variation. Once commensurated, a variable can be marked 
for collection by management, with procedures set in place to formulate a response.  In other 
words, commensurate information can be processed organizationally. 
While both heterogeneity and indiosyncrasy are used frequently in academic literature, it is 
useful to define them formally. Merriam Webster defines heterogenous as “consisting of 
dissimilar or diverse ingredients or constituents”, and idiosyncrasy as “a peculiarity of 
constitution or temperament:  an individualizing characteristic or quality” (Merriam Webster 
2015). For the purposes of this paper, heterogeneity refers to variation in an attribute among 
observations in a data set. Idiosyncrasy, in turn, refers to a characteristic that is unique to a 
particular observation, one without prior precedent.  
One thing that distinguishes heterogeneity from idiosyncrasy is the concept of commensuration. 
A variable that is merely heterogenous may have already been defined, measured, and observed 
in the past. It has already been commensurated. An idiosyncratic variation, however, is 
intrinsically novel and must be commensurated by the observer. It is, ex ante, uncommensurated. 
For a variable featuring heterogeneity, a hypothesis can be developed that creates a conceptual 
model to link these related observations, especially drawing on prior experience and objective 
and subjective information. Because idiosyncratic variation is uncommensurated, it cannot be 
plotted in a distribution. Links to related quantities of interest cannot be identified or divined 
from prior experience since by definition the event is novel; that is, prior experience with such an 
event does not exist. Such a situation is a classic case of an “unknown unknown”; where 
exploratory rather than exploitative learning is required to identify the broad outlines and general 
parameters of an unknown, novel situation (March 1991). A similar concept to idiosyncrasy can 
  
be found in Eisenhardt’s (1989) use of “serendipity” in case research. She recommends that 
“theory building from case study research is particularly appropriate because theory building 
from case studies does not rely on previous literature or prior empirical evidence.” For similar 
reasons, an employee on the front line can benefit from serendipitous insights from specific 
customers to discover opportunities unique to that particular case.  
The determination of which constructs are of interest and how they will be measured is an 
important one (Bearden, Netemeyer, and Hawes 2011; Hair et al. 2010). Normally, one uses 
prior experience to drive the decisions of what variables are of interest. One might also consider 
the expertise of others, or look at published material that may yield insights about what 
characteristics of a situation could be important.  For example, a meta-analysis on salesperson 
performance might be used to determine the drivers of salesperson performance (Churchill et al. 
1985; Verbeke, Dietz and Verwaal  2011). However, prior experience always traces back to 
some prior, original moment of commensuration. Experience in the form of a library of prior 
analogous situations assists in truncating commensuration (Gavetti et al 2004), but in a truly 
idiosyncratic situation, mindfulness on the part of an individual is required to identify those 
variables that are important in a specific instance but which had not been important in prior 
analogous situations (Langer 1989). Once the individual has commensurated the relevant 
variables of interest, they may redirect organizational attention to the process, and then apply 
organizational procedures and capabilities to evaluate potential implications to the organization. 
The nature of the commensuration and the shape it takes can have a profound impact on the 
organization’s interpretation of the observation and response to it (Kaplan 2008, Tuomi 1999, 
Alavi and Leidner 2001). This insight must necessarily start with a single individual operating at 
the organizational front line. Only then can it diffuse into the organization.  
  
Organizational researchers examining  attitudes, behaviors, and their outcomes  are often in the 
position of identifying and quantifying new constructs of interest (Boudreau et al 2001, Bearden 
et al 2011). But exploration of the “unknown unknowns” as a class represents a unique 
challenge. For researchers, it is tempting to explore and explicate the particulars of the situation’s 
idiosyncrasy. However, an essential quality in such a situation is its very novelty. Idiosyncrasy is 
therefore a marriage of both the event’s unique characteristics themselves and the fact of their 
uniqueness. For example, a company in the 1980’s might encounter a customer who demands an 
online inventory and fulfillment system. A state-owned enterprise might suddenly be privatized 
and forced to operate in an entirely different economic system. These two situations have 
nothing in common-- except that they are entirely novel and outside the experience of the firm 
encountering them. Their novelty is the common element. Many seemingly unrelated novel 
situations share one characteristic in common: the lack of available prior experience to guide the 
organization’s reaction to the situation.  
When a situation is encountered for the first time, there may be a number of unique aspects of 
the event, but not all of these are going to be of value in explaining and predicting behavior 
(Eisenhardt 1989). The goal of the firm is to determine which novel factors will be decisive in 
furthering the relationship or partnership, and which are merely distracting and irrelevant factors 
(Levinthal and Rerup 2006). Too-detailed an examination of the particulars of a novel event 
yields insights about the substance of the event at the expense of understanding the impact of its 
novelty. The very value of knowledge about the idiosyncratic characteristic can be its novelty, as 
opposed to its potential for generalization.   
  
Theoretical Models of Profitability 
Economic theories of profitability carry two common assumptions: there are differences between 
firms, and isolating mechanisms exist that prevent less-profitable firms from imitating more-
profitable firms (Dierickx and Cool 1989). A monopolist, for example, enjoys a market position 
that a potential entrant cannot profitably imitate due to barriers to entry. In the Resource-Based 
View of the Firm (RBV), some firms have qualities that are valuable (that is, contribute to 
profitability), rare (that is, other firms do not possess them), inimitable and non-substitutable 
(other firms cannot profitably achieve the more profitable firm’s market position) (Barney 1991). 
Dynamic capabilities perspectives on profitability assume that a firm’s adaptability enables it to 
seize either a long term advantage in the RBV sense, or iterate over a series of short term 
advantages (Teece, et al. 1997). In each case, an idiosyncratic and advantageous attribute 
(market position, a valuable resource, adaptability) is protected for a firm by an isolating 
mechanism of some kind.  
What unites these three perspectives is that of an emphasis on the distinctiveness of the vendor. 
However, it is not just vendors but also customers in a marketplace who can feature 
distinctiveness. A firm which has the distinctive ability to adapt to idiosyncratic features in their 
customer pool has an advantage as well, though this capability must itself be inimitable and non-
substitutable as different strains of adaptability are themselves equifinal even if they are 
inimitable (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000).  
To these “macro perspectives”, Dyer and Singh (1991) add another—that of “relational rents” 
derived from organizational relationships. This occurs when two organizations have resources 
which, while not in themselves capable of generating sustainable competitive advantage, can do 
so when integrated together. Following the logic of the RBV, such integrations require the 
  
creation of relationship-specific assets as the two partners mutually exploit the synergy 
(Crawford 1990; Williamson 1981). Once again, idiosyncrasy is a necessary (but not sufficient) 
condition for extra-normal profitability.  
Thus, a competitive advantage deriving from relational rents requires that boundary-spanning 
individuals detect, communicate, and structure the relationship around exploitation of 
idiosyncrasy. Managing to this goal is problematic. The idiosyncratic nature of sources of 
advantage resists systematic programs of investigation developed ex ante, in the same way that 
policy-makers cannot know the fruitfulness of a given line of scientific research until it has been 
pursued (Bush 1945).   
Transaction Specificity and Idiosyncrasy 
Dyer and Singh (1991) point out that a competitive advantage, when housed in the relationship 
between two organizations as opposed to either party on their own, has its genesis in synergies 
between sources of uniqueness found in each organization. This uniqueness is expressed as 
transaction- and relationship-specific assets. The idiosyncratic characteristics of a relationship 
are of particular concern to strategy theorists because idiosyncrasy is by definition rare, 
inimitable, and peculiar to a particular organization (Williamson 1981). Mutual adaptations 
between organizations then allow the mutual exploitation of synergies between each partner’s 
unique characteristics.  
By the same token, it is important to distinguish between idiosyncrasy and transaction 
specificity. Adaptations to idiosyncratic conditions are necessarily specific (because the 
condition being adapted to is unique). However, not all transaction specific assets are 
idiosyncratic. The classic example in transaction cost economics of an oil pipeline (Barney 
1999), for example, is specific to a particular source and destination, but hardly idiosyncratic. 
  
Other oil pipelines have been built before and will be built again, connecting other locations. The 
routines, procedures, and processes involved in the construction and operation of the pipeline can 
be reused on other pipelines, as can the knowledge skills used to create the pipeline. Similarly, 
any organization will have a variety of idiosyncratic characteristics which have no impact on 
profitability. It is the intersection between these two that is of interest in this article: the case 
where idiosyncrasy is present and impactful on the relationship between organizations.  
Idiosyncrasy becomes especially important where the harmonization of social or knowledge 
assets take place. An organization adapts to its relationship partner by changing its routines, 
systems, and procedures to fit these unique, uncommensurated characteristics (Teece 2007).  For 
example, a firm may adapt their normal RFP response to include unusual customizations or 
services that meet the specific needs of a particular organization but which may not be of any 
value to other firms in that particular industry (Friend et al 2014).  In another situation, for 
example, a supplier may need to eliminate certain standard features that the customer does not 
want because it has no benefit in that customer’s situation but still imposes technical trade-offs, 
costs, or other limitations to support the unused feature. 
As discussed earlier, commensuration takes place at the individual level. Once defined, the 
conceptual model that has been created must be diffused through the organization (Ye et al. 
2012). When a novel situation is encountered, agents of an organization must make sense of the 
situation individually in order to communicate and achieve agreement on the nature of the 
situation and the appropriate response (Ring and van de Ven 1994).  When two organizations 
come into contact to form a relationship, an iterative process of mutual discovery and sense-
making about the nature of the relationship ensues. Organizations must decide what issues and 
qualities they will attend to, and which they will dismiss (Ocasio 1997).  
  
Variation Among Relationship Partners  
Knightian Uncertainty (as opposed to risk) and commensuration 
In his landmark work, Knight (1921) discusses the distinction between idiosyncrasy and 
heterogeneity, with some differences in nomenclature and a focus on its statistical characteristics. 
He distinguishes between risk (commensurate events whose stochastic structure is well-known) 
and uncertainty (uncommensurated events whose nature and likelihood are not known to those 
involved), pointing out that uncertain events contribute to aggregated downstream variables 
which have been commensurated, such as overall profitability (Trigeorgis 1996). For the 
shareholder, innumerable uncertain events are aggregated into a single risk estimate for the value 
of their shares. For the manager, these uncertain events must be dealt with individually and 
idiosyncratically. The economics literature has subsequently applied these insights by exploring 
distribution-agnostic stochastic models to commensurated variables. This is appropriate 
considering the nature of the discipline.   
From an operational perspective, however, at the point at which the event can be acted upon by a 
decision-maker within the firm, the event has not yet aggregated into a well-commensurated 
downstream variable. The variable is still uncertain rather than merely risky, which we might call 
“upstream uncertainty”. Of course, risky events can be managed with “insurance” measures such 
as contract terms (Cannon and Perreault 1999).  Or, they can be aggregated into a portfolio, for 
example, or a third party can be found to manage the risk at some cost (Knight 1921, Kogut and 
Kulatilaka 2001). However, because the structure and often the nature of an uncertain event is 
unknown, uncertainty cannot be managed with traditional practices. That is, idiosyncratic 
situations cannot be treated as if they were synonymous with risks.  
  
Commensuration, Organizational Knowledge, and Attention 
Knowledge and uncertainty are two sides of the same coin (Knight 1921). The actual cost to 
manufacture a good, for example, comes laden with uncertainty over whether alternative 
production processes identified in the future might reduce this cost, what their hypothetical costs 
might be, when they might be identified, and what competencies might be required to implement 
these alternatives. The acquisition of organizational knowledge (in the form of discovery of a 
new manufacturing technique) resolves this uncertainty—less the lingering uncertainty regarding 
whether still other, even more efficient, techniques might someday emerge. Therefore, 
knowledge represents the resolution of uncertainty (March 1991; Bierman and Hausmen 1972, 
Trigeorgis 1996, Davenport and Prusak 1998).  
Caution is advised regarding the use of the term “uncertainty” rather than “risk”, and for good 
reason. The acquisition of knowledge is the exploration of the unknown. In Vannevar Bush’s 
(1945) seminal paper on technology policy, he points out that science advances according to its 
own intrinsic logic. The results of scientific inquiry cannot be programmed in advance, nor 
dictated by the needs of policy-makers. Scientists work to discover knowledge that already exists 
in the environment, and a policy-maker’s quest to ensure that the most important questions are 
answered is hobbled by the fact that the potential benefits of an answer is not known ex ante—
answering the question is the purpose of research. An anomaly stemming from a methodological 
refinement in some established field might upend that field if fully explored, while other more 
seemingly productive lines of work may yield only marginal returns. To paraphrase Sun Tzu 
(1993), victory in research can be discerned, but not manufactured. Bush concludes that the most 
effective avenue for technology policy is to avoid micromanaging or overly-specific research 
  
priorities, and instead to fund science broadly and allow it to proceed largely according to its 
own logic.  
Later work confirms this insight. The concept of bounded rationality demonstrates that search 
and cognition require an investment of limited attentional (Ocasio 1997) and cognitive resources 
(March and Simon 1958, Cyert and March 1963). Every possible variable cannot be measured 
because there are a nigh-infinite number of such variables, each of which can be measured in a 
variety of ways. The value of acquiring knowledge can only be known definitively once that 
knowledge has been acquired.  
Just as scientists, closest to the problems they work on, are at their most effective when they are 
given the widest possible latitude to explore research problems as they see fit (Bush 1945), 
boundary-spanners should be given similar latitude (Agnihotri et al. 2014, Ye et al 2012). This 
allows them to explore and understand possible idiosyncratic features of their firm’s 
relationships partners. These relational idiosyncrasies cannot be specified in advance; they can 
only be found in situ, leading some to refer to it as “manna from heaven”. (Fagerberg 2004, p.6) 
Boundary Spanners and the Diffusion of Organizational Knowledge 
Although the specifics of researching the idiosyncratic details inherent in inter-organizational 
relationships are different from advancing basic knowledge in biology or physics, the core line of 
logic still applies. In both cases, ex ante investments must be made to resolve uncertainty. The 
specialists conducting the research then explore idiosyncratically varying details of a 
phenomenon (in the latter case, the routines and procedures of the transaction partner), to 
identify variables of interest, their values, whether they might return profits to the organization, 
and how this might be accomplished. This is the process of commensuration (Espeland and 
Stevens 1998). As with basic research, these are relationship-specific and often transaction-
  
specific investments whose returns cannot be mapped stochastically in advance. Of course, in 
both science and inter-organizational relationship-building, there is also a good deal of 
incremental work to measure variables already known and to refine estimates of relationships 
between these variables. While important, in the current research we focus on the resolution of 
uncertainty of idiosyncrasies in the partner firm that is intrinsic to the sense-making process of 
relationship formation .  
These investments are made manifest through the activities of boundary-spanning individuals 
(Moncrief, Marshall and Laask 2006). It is their role to investigate a relationship partner and map 
its essential features (Palmatier et al. 2007). This consists of a process of mutual sense-making 
(Ring and van de Ven 1994), where the commensuration of variables that are anticipated to be of 
interest and elaboration of the mental model of the relationship partner’s characteristics takes 
place. While the latter process of elaboration (that is, measuring and exploiting variables of 
interest) can be attacked systematically, the process of commensuration is an exploratory process 
meant to detect variables that might be of interest. Bush’s (1945) logic of basic research limits 
the fruitfulness of specifying each variable ex ante by policy-makers. Instead, exploration 
requires an informed investment of limited attentional resources by the boundary-spanning 
individual.  
The resources must be committed by the boundary-spanning individual because they are the 
point of contact between organizations (Singh 2000). That is, the exposure to the new knowledge 
must be made at the interface between organizations, after which it can diffuse through the 
organization—assuming the boundary-spanner has attended to the information and considers it 
worth communicating to his organization (Ye et al. 2007, Ye et al. 2012).  As an illustration of 
this principle, consider a potential scenario. A company makes large, regular purchases of a 
  
technology product from a major manufacturer. This manufacturer, realizing that the product is 
difficult to substitute, attempts to use its leverage to raise prices. However, an alert warehouse 
employee at the customer’s firm recalls that, several years before, pallets of this product had 
been marked as having been shipped by another manufacturer. The warehouse employee alerts 
the account manager, who investigates and determines that indeed, the manufacturer had long 
since outsourced production of this product to a third party, and depended on secrecy rather than 
contractual terms to protect their position in the relationship. The customer arranges favorable 
terms with the upstream supplier, to both firms’ advantage, and dis-intermediates the 
manufacturer entirely. Successfully navigating this (non-idiosyncratic) situation by the firm 
depended on an insight from a single boundary-spanning individual, the warehouse employee.  
Thus, while relational knowledge is diffused and processed organizationally, the creation 
of that knowledge and the commensuration process that underlies it can only occur at the 
individual level, by the employee on the organizational frontline. Stimuli are collected and 
commensurated by individuals into knowledge, then processed and diffused through the 
collective. Indeed, it is the process of commensuration that permits this individual-to-collective 
transition to occur.  
Managing Idiosyncrasy 
The derivation of organizational benefits from idiosyncrasies in its relational partners comes in 
two distinct phases that span two levels of analysis. First, the idiosyncratic feature must be 
identified and commensurated. This occurs at the point of contact -- an observation made by a 
single boundary-spanning individual acting at the individual level. This individual must engage 
in exploratory learning (March 1991) if they are to encounter truly novel features of the 
relational partner. The individual then must evaluate each feature to determine if the feature has 
  
profit potential, regardless of whether that profit potential is housed in the organization or the 
relational dyad. Finally, the boundary-spanner must commensurate and describe the nature of the 
opportunity to others in the firm. These activities will be referred to as "detection competencies". 
Should a potentially fruitful idiosyncrasy be detected, it must then be communicated inward to 
the rest of the organization. At this point, we see a process whereby knowledge diffuses into the 
organization (Barr, et al. 1992). The organization then must evaluate the nature of the 
opportunity, assign appropriate resources to exploit the opportunity, and engage in adaptive 
behavior to fit the unique characteristics of the opportunity. These activities, taken at the 
organizational level, constitute "exploitation competencies", and is the expression of 
organizational learning and strategic change.  
 Zollo and Winter (2002) describe this process as having three distinct components. 
Knowledge must be accumulated by the firm based on existing organizational routines and 
procedures. Knowledge is then articulated into a form that can be shared through and processed 
by the organization’s members. Finally, knowledge is codified into a form that is actionable: 
documents, artifacts, and new routines and procedures. Ye and Singh (2012) then apply and 
extend this model in the domain of generating customer satisfaction at the organizational 
frontline. Customer-specific knowledge is generated (accumulation) at the individual level, then 
articulated through the work group. Finally, this knowledge is codified into specific customer-
facing actions meant to improved productivity and quality.  
 This paper applies the insights of Zollo and Winter (2002), and Ye et al. (2012) to the 
domain of relationally-based sustainable competitive advantage. Specifically, we propose a 
process model whereby idiosyncrasies detected and recognized as opportunities by individuals 
operating at the organizational frontline are then commensurated and diffused into the 
  
organization. At that point, the organization must evaluate the opportunity, and reconfigure its 
resource portfolio to adapt to the customer idiosyncrasy, thereby achieving dyadic rents and a 
sustainable competitive advantage. Following Ye et al. (2012), we place the knowledge 
accumulation task at the individual level in the hands of the organizational frontline, and the 
codification task at the firm level. However, we present the knowledge articulation phase as a 
two-level process of knowledge diffusion from individual to organization (see Figures 1 and 2).  
(FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE) 
 
  
 
 
 (FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE) 
  
 
 
Detection Competencies 
Detection occurs at the individual level (Ye et al. 2012). It is practiced by boundary-
spanners  who, through practice of their normal organizational functions, are situated such that 
they are in a position to observe unique partner attributes. These idiosyncratic features cannot be 
specified in advance because by definition they are novel and outside the prior experience of the 
firm. While many within the firm have the capability to generate insights about generalizable 
  
market characteristics; it is the employee operating on the organizational frontline alone who has 
the access and incentive to observe customer-specific idiosyncratic characteristics.  
Within these restrictions, a framework for detecting potential sources of advantage becomes 
apparent. Fostering detection competencies at the organizational level emerges as primarily a 
function of selecting, training, and enabling individuals to engage in exploratory learning 
behaviors, recognize unique and valuable opportunities when they see them, and then package 
and communicate knowledge about these opportunities for use by the firm (Abratt and Kelly 
2002; Sengupta et al. 2000). That is, the manager’s role is that of an encourager and facilitator, 
rather than as a conductor or administrator. In this way, he or she can maximize the probability 
that employees will discover the exploitable idiosyncrasies in their partner base and report them 
back to the firm.  
 
Investigation 
Boundary-spanners must have training in intelligence-gathering activities, both whether 
or not to engage in them and how to go about doing so (Hughes, et al. 2013). Indeed, the sales 
literature has established a strong link between learning orientation (Sujan et al. 1994) and 
individual performance. This echoes calls from the most influential clinical literature in the same 
field, which exhorts salespeople to maximize their investigation skills and, by doing so, enhance 
their ability to gain actionable intelligence about a firm (Rackham 1988).  Mindfulness, 
investigation ability, and learning orientation are all individual-level characteristics and 
constructs that bear on a salesperson’s ability to detect an idiosyncratic opportunity in a client 
firm.  The practice of intelligence-gathering by boundary-spanners individually equates to 
marketing intelligence as an organization-wide construct (Hughes, et al. 2013). 
  
Intelligence-gathering activities span beyond the domain of business activities, of course. 
In addition to the classic intelligence-gathering activities of traditional business functions such as 
salespeople (Hughes et al. 2013), it is fruitful to look at the traits that are encouraged in 
professional intelligence officers. The KGB, intelligence arm of the former Soviet Union and 
widely considered the largest and most effective intelligence agency of its time, preferred 
officers who were highly extroverted, intelligent, and alert, with an eye for detail (Dulles 1963, 
Andrews and Mitrokhin 1999, Andrews and Gordievsky 1992). Emphasis was placed primarily 
on agent recruitment; however, officers were also expected to maintain wide networks that were 
both social and professional in nature. Rezidents stressed the importance of gathering 
information from multiple sources, not just to verify accuracy but also to gain a complete picture 
of the target; a policy shared by other intelligence agencies (Eftimiades 1994). Finally, an 
important policy guiding agent recruitment decisions is the “targeting principle”: a form of 
directed research where the intelligence officer undergoes a process of formally planning the 
development of his or her social network to fulfill specific information needs (Andrews and 
Gordievsky 1994). The targeting principle is not unlike the strategic planning used to target key 
members of an organizational buying center in a complex sales environment (Johnston and 
Bonoma 1981).  
Many of these insights can be applied to legitimate employees operating on the 
organizational frontline. Boundary spanners who engage in frequent, rich sharing of information 
with multiple informants, and then process their observations in light of multiple sources, have 
more opportunities to observe the idiosyncratic characteristics of their relational partners. Doing 
this requires the boundary spanner to be gregarious, but also to focus as much on observation and 
information-gathering as on persuasion and satisfaction of partner needs.  
  
In addition to the active search for and acquisition of information, frontline employees 
must also be able to recognize idiosyncratic opportunities when they see them. Langer (1989, p. 
138) defines mindfulness as “a state of alertness and lively awareness [...] expressed in active 
information processing, characterized by cognitive differentiation”. A similar view frames 
mindfulness as  “attentiveness to one’s context and the capacity to respond to unanticipated cues 
or signals from one’s context” (Levinthal and Rerup 2006, p. 504). What both of these 
perspectives capture is the notion that an exogenous feature catches the attention of an observer 
not specifically primed to look for it. In particular, Langer’s concept of cognitive differentiation 
deals with identifying distinctive features and commonalities of phenomena, quite similar in 
spirit to that of commensuration. Just as the intelligence-gathering component of detection 
exposes the boundary-spanner to unique characteristics of a partner firm, mindfulness brings that 
unique feature’s significance to mind.  
P1: Frontline employees who have a high degree of competence in investigation of customer 
idiosyncrasies will be more likely to identify potentially fruitful sources of dyadic competitive 
advantage.  
 
Industry Knowledge 
A second component of detection competencies requires not just expertise related to the 
relationship itself (such as knowledge of persuasion tactics, the personalities and organizational 
roles of the partner firm, etc) (Menguc, et al. 2013), but also knowledge related to the substance 
of the operations engaged in by both partner firms (Grant 1996; Ingram et al. 2015). Substantive 
knowledge, while not a traditional “selling” skill, provides the necessary foundation for a 
boundary spanner to identify, evaluate, and position potential avenues of advance for the 
partners.  One manifestation of substantive knowledge is industry knowledge. This enables the 
boundary spanner to contextualize his partner-specific knowledge in terms of industry-level 
  
norms. Close customer relationships can improve their ability to gain information necessary to 
identify these situations within an account (Mullins et al. 2014).  
Knowledge in the strategic literature has primarily been studied at the organizational 
level. There are different routines for information search (March 1992), differing capacities for 
firms to absorb knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1990), and the potential for sustainable 
competitive advantage to firms with the right knowledge (Grant 1996). Strategic conceptions of 
knowledge suffuse this study; however, in this section we look specifically at the domain 
knowledge of an individual employee operating at the organizational front line. For this 
employee, knowledge can be a critical driver of overall performance (Sharma et al. 2007, Leigh 
et al. 2014). Among the work functions on the organization frontline, personal selling has 
extensively researched the link between knowledge, knowledge structures, and performance (e.g. 
Weitz et al. 1986, Sujan et al. 1994, Rapp et al. 2006). However, these studies primarily focus on 
knowledge related to persuasive communications such as customer knowledge or competitive 
intelligence. Substantive knowledge that can be related to firm-level adaptations to particular 
customer requirements, that is, value-creating as opposed to deal-winning has taken a secondary 
position in the selling literature.  
Having become aware of an idiosyncratic characteristic of a partner firm, the boundary-
spanning employee must be able to contextualize this characteristic in terms of its relationship to 
the business processes and operations of each organization in the relational dyad. Industry 
knowledge serves the purpose of providing this context. This general understanding of the 
business at hand has previously been suggested to be an important characteristic in sales 
managers (Deeter-Schmeltz et al. 2008) and service representatives (Coulter and Coulter 2003). 
  
P2: Frontline employees who have a high degree of substantive knowledge relating to both 
partner firms will be more likely to identify potentially fruitful sources of dyadic competitive 
advantage.  
 
Creative Performance 
 Frontline employees seeking to detect idiosyncrasy operate in an environment where the fruits 
of their search will be as-yet uncommensurated. These are vague, unstructured, novel, and 
impossible to define ex ante. Such problems require not merely operational skill, but also 
creativity (Amabile 1988). Creativity is “the production of novel and useful ideas by an 
individual or small group of individuals working together” (ibid, p. 126). It a characteristic that is 
a combination of “found art” (a personal trait that can be selected for) and something that can be 
fostered in an individual through training, the elusive “something else”.  
Wang and Netemeyer (2004) identify creative performance as an important antecedent of 
salesperson performance, stressing that creativity’s role weakly relates to the sales “pitch” but 
has a broader role in boundary-spanning relational functions such as self-defining their sales 
tasks, satisfying customer demands, and (most critically for our purposes) effort to improve 
one’s personal skill and domain-specific knowledge. Wang and Netemeyer go on to demonstrate 
that for this type of frontline employee, creative performance is linked to overall salesperson 
performance.  The value of creativity may be even greater in the turbulent environment of major 
sales where innovation, speed, and flexibility are essential (Chonko and Jones 2005). Creativity 
has been recognized as an important aspect of superior performance in business as well as non-
business arenas (Kanter 1983; Amiable 1988).   
It is in these non-pitch-related substantive areas where creativity can be most useful. By breaking 
with old preconceptions and pre-existing mental models, frontline employees high in creativity 
are capable of seeing situations where those preconceptions no longer apply, and can in turn start 
  
the organization on the long road to organizational change (Barr et al. 1992). Given access to 
partner-specific information through investigation, contextualized in a broader understanding of 
the business domain in which that partner-specific information can be understood, creativity is 
the final ingredient required for these facts to re-crystalize into new insights and recognition of 
new opportunities.  
P3: Frontline employees who have a high level of creative performance will be more likely to 
identify potentially fruitful sources of dyadic competitive advantage.  
 
Firm-level Cultivation of Detection Competencies 
Recruitment 
Finding and recruiting individuals with the requisite skill set to be successful in the workplace is 
never easy (Breaugh 2009; Zoltners, Sinha, and Lorimer 2009). In boundary-spanning positions 
such as key account sales, the difficulty of that task is magnified (Ingram et al. 2009; Jaramillo, 
Mulki and Boles 2011; Johnson and Sohi 2013) when one realizes that the skills needed to 
successfully manage a key account and fend off competitors are added to general selling ability 
and work ethic (Brown and Peterson 1994; Verbeke et al. 2011; Boles et al. 2012). When filling 
sales positions, the intuition of successful salespeople who have demonstrated success in finding 
exploitable idiosyncrasies in customer organizations may play a role in the hiring process when a 
firm seeking account managers who can detect areas of unique need within a customer’s 
organization (Miles and Sadler-Smith 2014). Ideally, intuition is used in conjunction with other 
selection tools that are less subjective.  
Research suggests that individuals with a learning orientation tend to be more effective in sales 
positions than those with performance orientations (Spiro and Weitz 1990; Chonko, et al. 2002; 
Ahearne, et al. 2010). By applying their efforts towards developing knowledge about customers, 
  
they can increase the efficacy of their work (Sujan et al. 1994). This selling knowledge 
encompasses a variety of different areas, but most especially customer-specific intelligence 
gathering, which in turn facilitates the salesman adapting his behaviors to the specific needs and 
decision-making processes of a specific customer (Spiro and Weitz 1990, Weitz 1978). Much of 
this research has been grounded in studies of non-strategic accounts. We propose that the 
dynamics of gathering customer-specific knowledge applies equally in the specific case of 
creating strategic advantage through customer idiosyncrasy.  
While there is little research on determining the best “type” of hire to find idiosyncrasy in 
customers, several traits appear to hold some promise. In the strategic account setting, having the 
patience to ask questions of many individuals within an organization may be one of the most 
important traits in “fitting” the job which helps the salesperson find areas of unique value (Abratt 
and Kelly 2002). Innovative salespeople who are high in creative performance are already known 
to be stronger overall performers (Wang and Netemeyer 2004), they are also likely to be more 
adept at discovering idiosyncratic opportunities. Likewise, salespeople who exhibit a high  level 
of customer orientation may have a better chance of uncovering specific needs that are not being 
met which hold promise as a method of securing an advantage over the competition (Saxe and 
Weitz 1982;  Guenzi, De Luca Troilo 2011; Terho et al. 2015). While some of these behaviors 
can be the subject of training, hiring those individuals who are already oriented toward these 
behaviors may enhance effectiveness.  
Training 
The process for a given boundary-spanner to successfully execute detection competencies is to 
first know to look and how to look for idiosyncratic variation in a relationship partner.  These 
and other selling skills are primarily gained through training (e.g. Ohanian 2007; Skiera and 
  
Albers 2008). Given that the boundary spanner has, or acquires, these investigative skills he must 
then employ industry knowledge, as well as creativity, to recognize an idiosyncratic feature as 
potentially valuable. Finally, given a potential for sustainable relational competitive advantage, 
skill in strategy communication is required to diffuse this knowledge into his firm.   
It is critically important that training be structured around these key competencies that frontline 
personnel need in order to be successful (Zoltners et al. 2009). In the absence of extant academic 
literature on detection and commensuration processes, firms must develop and refine their own 
organizational routines. For example, a firm may observe current salespeople who exhibit the 
ability to uncover idiosyncratic characteristics within an account that may be exploitable for 
unique value.  Finding out what these individuals do differently from less successful salespeople 
can then be used to determine what skills to include in a firm’s training process. 
Organizational Culture 
Behaviors required to detect partner-specific idiosyncrasies requires an investment of firm 
resources (time, attention, monetary) (Menguc, et al. 2013).  For these reasons, detection is not a 
free activity, as it requires resources and time that could be used elsewhere or with other 
partners.  There is also the risk that an identified opportunity cannot return value sufficient to 
justify the costs of its explication. Due to the cost involved to the firm, organizations vary in the 
degree of discretion granted to make decisions autonomously as they expend firm resources 
(Barrutia et al. 2009; Leach et al. 2003; Sallee and Flaherty 2003).  
Organizations with a high level of empowerment for their frontline give them broad latitude to 
engage in self-directed intelligence-gathering activities (Ahearne et al. 2005). Those with 
comparably lower levels of empowerment restrict or regulate the process and degree of customer 
engagement so as to conserve resources or conform to a centrally established relational process. 
  
The level of empowerment of a firm varies based on the internal control system used (Anderson 
and Oliver 1987; Cravens et al. 1993; Zoltners et al. 2006); this can manifest as specific policies 
and procedures, or as tacit expectations imposed by organizational culture (Ouchi 1980). The 
degree of empowerment a firm grants to its boundary-spanners is also linked to the level of 
training and hiring standards employed by the firm. 
For detection of idiosyncrasy to occur, the boundary-spanner must engage actively with the 
relationship partner (Friend et al. 2014). The boundary-spanner employs dialog and observation, 
potentially spanning multiple dyads and different functional areas within the firm (Johnston and 
Bonoma 1981). As these activities must be performed by the boundary-spanner at the individual 
level, the decision to make the required investments must also be taken at this level. This 
requires that boundary-spanners be empowered with authority to employ these actions at their 
own discretion (Ye et al. 2012). 
P4: Firms configured to foster the detection competencies of its boundary-spanning personnel 
will be more likely to detect potentially fruitful sources of dyadic competitive advantage from its 
partners.  
 
Diffusion 
The act of gathering idiosyncratic information is necessarily conducted by a  single person 
operating at the organizational front line. Having found a potentially fruitful customer 
idiosyncrasy, the individual must commensurate this knowledge into a form that lends itself to 
cognition by both that individual and his or her colleagues, a cognitive frame that can be 
communicated and is “portable” across operating groups and through the firm (Kaplan 2008).  
The organization’s role is to be attuned to partner-specific knowledge generated by the 
boundary-spanner. This approach suggests a bottom-up organization. It presents a generalized 
case of the logic of adaptive selling used in the sales literature (Spiro and Weitz 1990, Franke 
  
and Park 2006) driving an emergent corporate strategy around exploitation of knowledge derived 
at the frontline.  
Marshalling and organizing organizational resources to adapt to an opportunity, which is central 
to the process of exploiting an idiosyncrasy (below), requires leadership and coordination. The 
knowledge diffusion process occurs at the organizational level (Barr et al. 1992), but finds its 
genesis with insights commensurated by the individual. As an individual commensurates the 
idiosyncratic opportunity, they generate a cognitive frame through which to make sense of the 
unique characteristic of interest. These frames then diffuse through the organization as a part of 
the overall political process of evaluating options and priorities (Kaplan 2008). This is an 
elaboration of the general, continuous process of mutual sense-making that is a component of 
any interorganizational relationship (Ring and van de Ven 1994).  
Organizational learning represents the firm-level component of the interface between an 
organizational frontline and the firm as a whole (Ye et al. 2012). Just as different individuals 
have differing abilities to elucidate their discoveries about partner firms, different organizations 
have different propensities for knowledge to propagate within them. Thus, the capacity for and 
propensity to engage in organizational learning -- absorptive capacity -- represents the ease with 
which knowledge generated by boundary spanners diffuses through the organization to crucial 
organizational decision-makers and stakeholders (Cohen and Levinthal 1990).  
P5: Relationships mediated by a frontline employee with a high level of competence in 
knowledge articulation, in a firm high in absorptive capacity, will be more likely to successfully 
convert potentially fruitful partner idiosyncrasies into dyadic competitive advantage for the firm.  
  
 
Exploitation Competencies  Organization-level variable 
While the detection of potentially fruitful idiosyncrasy is made by an individual, the subsequent 
exploitation of partner-level novelty requires coordinated activity by the firm as a whole. 
Exploitation competencies require evaluation of the opportunity, availability of resources to 
exploit the opportunity (either from organizational slack or re-purposed from other activities), 
and the capability to quickly and effectively reconfigure the structure of the firm to fit the new 
situation. 
Evaluation 
Once information has been developed by the boundary spanner and diffused into the firm as a 
whole, it must be interpreted and acted upon by decision-makers (Nadkarni and Barr 2008). 
Decision-makers within a firm have limited cognitive resources and must invest them 
parsimoniously. In particular, top managers are charged with collating, integrating, and 
interpreting information for the firm (Child 1972; McDonald et al. 1997).  
Ocasio (1997) argues that given the vast importance of information to both a firm’s structure and 
its behavior, and the limited attentional and cognitive resources of its decision-makers, that the 
quantity and distribution of a firm’s limited attentional resources must take a central role in 
understanding firm behavior and performance. As senior managers become aware of 
idiosyncratic characteristics in their partner firms, they must decide first whether to attend to this 
information, and then determine whether it is potentially fruitful as a source of sustainable 
competitive advantage.  Finally, the decision-makers must decide if the firm should enact the 
organizational changes required to exploit this opportunity (Ryals and Davies 2013).  
  
In addition to the cognitive barriers to managerial acceptance of an opportunity, there are also 
affective and cultural barriers as well (March and Simon 1958, Cyert and March 1963). Studies 
of organizations facing the need for organizational change show the importance of challenging 
and revising mental models.  Given information about critical opportunities and challenges in the 
environment, some organizations will utilize this information while others do not recognize the 
link between information and attendant strategic adaptations (Barr et al. 1992). Thus evaluation 
and willingness to act on a strategic opportunity requires attentive focus on the part of the 
manager, analytical capabilities to evaluate the information on a substantive level, and finally a 
propensity to challenge a status quo and approve organizational changes.  
P6: Firms with a high degree of evaluative competence will be more likely to convert potentially 
fruitful partner idiosyncrasies into dyadic competitive advantage for the firm.  
 
Available Resources 
Essential to the exploitation of opportunities that have been identified is having organizational 
resources available to apply. This is the essence of real options logic (Kogut and Kulatilaka 
1994). Decision-making can be enhanced by the availability of a choice to defer the decision-
making, and therefore leave resources available to avoid foreclosing unforeseen future 
opportunities. Where the opportunity is to forge a sustainable competitive advantage that is 
housed in the relationship between the firm and one or more of its partners, these investments 
take the form of relationship-specific adaptations (Dyer and Singh 1998). The real options 
approach lends itself strongly to the idiosyncrasy/commensuration dynamic. In this case, 
reservation and allocation of slack organizational resources to enable deferred future decision-
making is a powerful tool that allows a firm to  retain preferential access. 
  
The interaction between the timing of a decision and the availability of knowledge that helps 
optimize the decision can be complex. In some cases, the simple NPV analysis is sufficient: a 
decision can be made at t0 that adapts to an uncertain event which might occur at t1. In other 
cases, a “wait and learn” approach is called for: the decision-maker defers a decision until t1 and 
then reacts to the uncertain event once it has or has not manifested. Real options posits a third 
situation, where facing an uncertain event at t1, the decision-maker makes a partial investment in 
t0 to retain preferential access to the potential benefits, benefits not available if he simply defers 
any investment at all (Trigeorgis 1996). This initial investment is analogous to a trader buying a 
financial option. In finance, such investments are monetary; however, the fundamental logic can 
be applied to other scarce organizational resources: time, attention, production capacity, and 
relationship-maintaining capabilities (Kogut and Kulatilaka 1994, Kogut and Kulatilaka 2001).  
Real options are the managerial parallel to financial options. Firms deploy intelligence-gathering 
resources (boundary spanners employing detection competencies) just as a financier buys a 
financial option. Then, based on partner idiosyncrasies that have been identified as potential 
sources for relationally-housed sustainable competitive advantage, the firm evaluates the new 
information and makes the decision to employ a partner-specific adaptation (exercise the option) 
or not (allow the option to expire). Doing so represents the use of the firm’s exploitation 
competencies.  
Thus, real options provides a theoretical lens through which to evaluate the reservation of 
unallocated resources. Empirical research appears to support the value of organizational slack as 
a strategic reserve that can drive increased profitability (e.g. Tan and Peng 2003, Marlin and 
Geiger 2015); this model suggests that relational adaptations benefit particularly from these 
available resources.  
  
P7: Firms with a high level of organizational slack will be more likely to convert potentially 
fruitful partner idiosyncrasies into dyadic competitive advantage for the firm.  
 
Reconfiguration 
Given a strategic opportunity, the available resources to exploit the opportunity, and the 
managerial decision to execute on it, the final step is reconfiguration of the firm to enact the 
adaptation. Organizations vary in their capability to enact such changes, and strategy scholars 
have long recognized the importance of dynamic capabilities to improve strategic fit between the 
firm and its environment (including its relational partners) (Teece et al. 1997). The degree to 
which this capability exists determines whether and how quickly the firm adapts to exogenous 
change.  
With regard to idiosyncratic competitive advantage, it is especially important to focus on one 
aspect of this process: the ability of a company to alter its configuration to adapt to new 
opportunities. Grant’s (2003) concept of planned emergence illustrates this process in action in 
the oil industry. Rather than follow an entirely planned or emergent strategy, Grant found that oil 
companies set in place procedures and resources in anticipation of opportunities which had not 
yet manifested. Put another way, planned emergence borrows from emergent strategy the 
recognition that opportunities cannot always be foreseen and are often exogenous to agency by 
the firm, but from the strategic planning perspective the idea that the fact that there will be 
opportunities can be predicted in general, even if their specific nature cannot be anticipated, and 
sets about preparations to take them when they appear.  
While dynamic capabilities have been criticized as being equifinal (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; 
Marlin and Geiger 2015), when combined with detection competencies that identify pairings 
between unique features of both relationship partners, these capabilities can now enable creation 
  
of a subsequent competitive advantage. Eisenhardt and Martin’s critique is that dynamic 
capabilities lack an isolation mechanism to secure exclusivity; in this model that exclusivity is 
housed in the unique nature of the partner idiosyncrasy. It is the idiosyncratic nature of the 
customer adaptation rather than the fact of adaptability itself that makes one set of dynamic 
capabilities unsubstitutable for another.  
In addition to the cognitive and cultural obstacles to change and resource availability discussed 
above, there are also structural differences between firms which enable some to change more 
readily than others. This can be due to semi-structures (limited points of wide articulation 
interspersed among more broadly predictable routines) (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997), superior 
capabilities in knowledge management (Grant 1996, March 1992), innovative human resources 
practices (Jantunen 2005), organizational slack (March and Simon 1958, Cyert and March 1963), 
or planned emergence (processes designed to address opportunities as they appear) (Grant 2003).  
Whatever the particular manifestation of dynamic capabilities, in the final analysis, it is crucial 
that a firm seeking to exploit opportunities that emerge in partner idiosyncrasies have them in 
some form. Teece (2007) suggests four microfoundations for these combination/reconfiguration 
competencies: decomposability, governance, cospecialization, and knowledge management. 
Only once resources have been appropriately re-allocated and deployed to address the 
opportunity can the organization expect to establish the competitive advantage-- and thus 
supernormal profits-- that these difficult-to-imitate opportunities offer.  
P8: Firms with a high level of dynamic capabilities will be more likely to convert potentially 
fruitful partner idiosyncrasies into dyadic competitive advantage for the firm.  
Discussion 
When developing a strategy for interorganizational relationships, and especially for the 
management of boundary-spanners, there is a tendency to frame the issue as top-down 
  
management through analytics and process on one hand (Anderson and Oliver 1987; Cravens, et 
al. 1993), versus bottom-up management through outcome-based controls and empowerment on 
the other (e.g. Mantrala et al. 1994, Albers 1996, Mantrala et al. 2010).  Attempts to impose 
strategic opportunities from on high, or for single “lone ranger” key account managers to attempt 
to exploit opportunities by themselves, may be equally ill-advised. This paper suggests that 
developing dyadic sources of sustainable competitive advantage requires an integrative approach 
that stresses cooperation and coordination between boundary-spanners and the top management 
team.  
The frontline, as the organization’s intelligence-gathering arm, require the authority to gather 
partner intelligence reactively in response to organizational requests for structured, 
commensurated information (Singh 2000, Ye et al. 2012). They also need to be able to 
proactively determine the “unknown unknowns”-- undirected exploratory learning (March 1991) 
to determine the idiosyncratic characteristics of a partner that cannot be predicted ex ante but 
from which the potential exists for relationship-specific adaptations to derive long term mutual 
advantage for the partners. Meanwhile, the frontline on its own is ill-suited to making 
commitments and strategic resource allocations that impact the organization as a whole. It is the 
top-level management team that must evaluate and exploit the opportunities, setting priorities at 
the operational level based on the environmental intelligence gathered by the boundary spanners.  
This suggests a bottom-up process for intelligence gathering, married to a top-down process for 
opportunity evaluation and exploitation. Frontline employees are given broad latitude to collect 
information and probe for opportunities. The information thus gathered drives a structured, top-
down process of implementation, where insights can be quickly made actionable for the 
particular customer relationship. The need for a hybrid approach to organizational distribution of 
  
authority is similar in principle to the notion of semi-structures, which are clearly delineated 
points of articulation and rigidity within a firm (Eisenhardt 1989).  Once an actionable event is 
identified, executive action is necessary in order to effectively marshall needed resources to 
address the point of advantage identified by the boundary-spanner. 
For example, a salesperson discovers an idiosyncratic characteristic in one of its customers that 
might be fruitful; he reports this fact to others in the firm. That is, the relationship-specific 
knowledge diffuses through the organization. At that point, the firm analyzes the opportunity 
and, if it is likely to produce sustainable competitive advantage, exerts its dynamic capabilities to 
adapt to the new information. Had the investments in relationship-building and dynamic 
capabilities not occurred, the firm would have been able to identify or exploit the opportunity in 
a timely fashion. Thus, these investments provide preferential access to a future return based on 
not-yet-resolved uncertainty-- a classic real option. These relationship-specific investments, 
which derive unique and inimitable value from the partnership, result in mutual advantage for 
both partners in the dyad (Dyer and Singh 1998).  
Future Research  
In addition to the propositions developed above, there are many avenues for further exploration 
of the concept and application of idiosyncrasy in an organizational context. Each of the steps 
given in the general process model paints with a broad brush a series of highly complex discrete 
steps and competencies. A more precise understanding of how these steps are impacted when the 
subject is partner-specific idiosyncrasy would help clarify whether an organization must be 
engineered with relational rents in mind, at the expense of other competencies or whether these 
are more universal in their application.  
  
The process of commensuration is an important part of the sociology literature (Espeland and 
Stevens 1998), but applying and adapting this concept in the domain of the for-profit firm is 
another avenue of exploration. What is the process of commensuration in a for-profit firm? How 
are idiosyncrasies identified, framed and communicated to other actors? How does this fit into 
the larger problem of organizational sense-making? A given phenomenon can be framed in many 
ways, each of which might drive a different conclusion (Kaplan 2008). How does the choice of 
frames or the use of analogical reasoning impact the downstream processing, diffusion, and 
exploitation of that phenomenon?  
Similarly, commensuration and diffusion can occur in two directions. Even as the new 
knowledge diffuses from the boundary spanner into a partner firm, that same knowledge (and the 
attendant processing and exploitation) can cross the gap between organizations to its partner 
firm. Does the point of origination matter? For example, does it matter whether the idea 
originates from a salesman or the project champion of the buying firm? Can a strong competency 
at communications and top-level management sensitivity to opportunities allow a firm to free-
ride on the opportunity-identification capabilities of its partners?  
In this vein, while the general process of opportunity identification and exploitation can follow a 
consistent pattern, how might this pattern be applied in different boundary-spanning contexts? 
Might the differing norms and role concepts of sales executives, customer service managers, 
purchasing agents, business development executives, operations managers, logistics managers, or 
R&D engineers cause systemic variation in the process or efficacy of detection and exploitation 
competencies? To what extent might these differences stem from variation in individual 
characteristics, role characteristics, or organizational culture, routines, and processes?  These 
  
questions are among those that need to be answered if we are to fully understand the role of 
idiosyncratic information discovery and transmittance between and within organizations. 
Not all idiosyncratic attributes of partner firms represent opportunities for dyadic advantage. 
Many if not most such distinguishing characteristics have no impact on overall performance. Is it 
possible that adaptations to some characteristics actually impede the joint productivity of the 
partners?  If so, in what instances does that drag on firm effectiveness occur? The literature in 
transaction cost economics is quite robust in answering these questions. Indeed, the concept of 
relational rents answers the question of why companies create relationship-specific investments 
in the first place. Once these investments are made, they follow the logic of transaction cost 
economics (Williamson 1981). Attention must be made not just to joint value creation but the 
related question of how the parties divide the rents generated jointly (Jap 2001). In addition, 
there are relational questions that stem from relationship-specific investments that impact 
relationship quality by affecting the relational orientation of the partners, their relative 
negotiating leverage, mutual trust, and overall relationship quality (Cannon and Perreault 1999; 
Palmatier et al 2007).  
Conclusion 
A firm can create and sustain competitive advantage over time through its relationships with 
other firms by discovering fruitful idiosyncrasies and adapting to them. These unique and novel 
points of differentiation make them challenging to detect but also difficult for competitors to 
diagnose and imitate.  
Translating the potential for supernormal performance into actuality requires action by both the 
firm as a whole and individuals acting on the organizational frontline. Individuals must recognize 
the opportunities inherent in the idiosyncratic characteristics of its partners and then successfully 
  
commensurate, codify, and diffuse them into the organization’s knowledge base. For its part, the 
organization acts to absorb, evaluate, and exploit opportunities that are generated by its partner-
facing employees.  
Although firms and academics recognize the operational value of strong relationships, in the race 
to operate and optimize it is often tempting to treat adaptation as a customer-winning rather than 
market-leading strategy. Idiosyncrasies, all too often overlooked as outliers and or buried in error 
terms, represent a rich source of untapped potential for organizations seeking to harness the 
power of their relationships.  
References 
Abratt, Russell and Phillip Michael Kelly  (2002), “ Customer-Supplier Partnerships:  
Perceptions of a Successful Key Account Management Program,” Industrial Marketing 
Management 31 (5), 467-476. 
Agnihotri, Raj, Adam A. Rapp, James Andzulis, Colin B. Gabler (2014), “Examining the Drivers 
and Performance Implications of Boundary Spanner Creativity,”  Journal of Service Research 17 
(2), 164-181 
Ahearne, Michael, John Mathieu, and Adam Rapp (2005) "To Empower or Not to Empower 
Your Sales Force? An Empirical Examination of the Influence of Leadership Empowerment 
Behavior on Customer Satisfaction and Performance." Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol 
90(5), 945-955 
Ahearne, Michael, Son K. Lam, John E. Mathieu, and Willy Bolander (2010), “Why are some 
Salespeople Better at Adapting to Organizational Change,” Journal of Marketing 74 (3), 65-79. 
  
Alavi, M., & Leidner, D. E.. (2001). “Review: Knowledge Management and Knowledge 
Management Systems: Conceptual Foundations and Research Issues.” MIS Quarterly, 25(1), 
107–136 
Albers, Sönke (1996) "CAPPLAN: a decision‐ support system for planning the pricing and sales 
effort policy of a salesforce", European Journal of Marketing, Vol. 30 Iss: 7, pp.68 - 82. 
Amabile, Teresa M. (1988), “A Model of Creativity and Innovation in Organizations,” in 
Research in Organizational Behavior, Vol. 10, BArry M. Staw and Larry L. Cummings, eds., 
Greenwich, CTY:  JAI Press, 123-167. 
Anderson, Erin and Richard Oliver (1987), “Perspectives on Behavior-Based versus Outcome 
Based Sales Force Control Systems,” Journal of Marketing 51 (4), 76-88. 
Andrew, Christopher and Vasili Mitrokhin (1999) The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin 
Archive and the Secret History of the KGB Basic Books, New York, NY.  
Andrew, Christopher and Oleg Gordievsky (1992) KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign 
Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev Harpercolllins , New York, NY.  
Andrew, Christopher and Oleg Gordievsky (1992) Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions: Top 
Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985 Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA.  
Bakar, Z.A.,  R. Mohemad, A. Ahmad, and M.M. Deris (2006), “A Comparative Study for 
Outlier Detection TEchniques in Data Mining,” 2006 IEEE Conference on Cybernetics and 
Intelligent Systems, Bangkok Thailand.  
Barney, Jay (1991), “Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage,” Journal of 
Management 17 (1), 99-120. 
Barney, J. B. (1999). How a firm's capabilities affect boundary decisions. Sloan Management 
Review, 40(3), 137-145.  
  
Barr, P. S., Stimpert, J. L. and Huff, A. S. (1992), “Cognitive change, strategic action, and 
organizational renewal.” Strategic Management Journal, 13: 15–36. 
Barrutia, Jose M., Jon Charterina, and Ainhize Gilsanz (2009), “Salesperson Empowerment in 
Spanish Banks:  A Performance-Driven View,” Journal of Financial Services Marketing 14 (1), 
40-55. 
 Bearden, William O., Richard G. Netemeyer, Kelly L. Haws (2011), Handbook of Marketing 
Scales, Third Ed., Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks CA. 
Bierman, Harold and Warren H. Hausmen (1972), “The Resolution of Investment Uncertainty 
Through Time,” Management Science 18 (12), 654-662. 
Boles, James S., George W. Dudley, Vincent Onyemah, Dominique Rouziès, and William A. 
Weeks (2012). “Sales force turnover and retention: A research agenda,” Journal of Personal 
Selling & Sales Management, 32 (Winter), 131-140. 
Boudreau, Marie-Claude, David Gefen and Detmar W. Straub (2001) "Validation in Information 
Systems Research: A State-of-the-Art Assessment" MIS Quarterly, 25 (1), pp. 1-16 
J.A. Breaugh (2009) "The use of biodata for employee selection: Past research and future 
directions" Human Resource Management Review 19, pp. 219–23 
Brown, Stephen P. and Robert A. Peterson (1994), “The effect of effort on job performance and 
job satisfaction,” Journal of Marketing, 58 (April), 70-80. 
Brown, Shona L. and Kathleen M. Eisenhardt (1997) "The Art of Continuous Change: Linking 
Complexity Theory and Time-Paced Evolution in Relentlessly Shifting Organizations"  
Administrative Science Quarterly, 42 (1), pp. 1-34. 
Bush, Vannevar (1945), “Science the Endless Frontier,”  A Report to the President by the 
Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development:  U.S. Govt. Printing Office. 
  
Cannon, Joseph P. and William Perreault (1999), “Buyer Seller Relationships in Business 
Markets“ Journal of Marketing Research  36 (4) 439-460. 
Child, John (1972), “Organizational Structure, Environment and Performance: The Role of 
Strategic Choice” Sociology January 1972 vol. 6 no. 1 1-22. 
Chonko, Larry, Eli Jones, James A. Roberts, and Alan J. Dubinsky (2002), “The Role of 
Environmental Turbulence, Readiness for Change, and Salesperson Learning Orientation, In the 
Success of Sales Force Change,” Journal of Personal Selling and Sales Management 22 (Fall) 
227-245 
Chonko, Larry and Eli Jones (2005), “The Need for Speed:  Agility Selling,” Journal of Personal 
Selling and Sales Management,” 25 (4), 371-382. 
Churchill, Gilbert A., Neil M. Ford, Steven H. Hartley, and Orville C. Walker (1985), “The 
Determinants of Salesperson Performance:  A Meta-Analysis,” Journal of Marketing Research 
22 (1), 103-118. 
Cohen, Jacob, Patricia Cohen, Stephen G. West, and Leona S. Aiken (2003), Applied Multiple 
Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences  3rd Edition.  Mahwah, NJ:  
Erlbaum, 728 pp. 
Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A.. (1990). “Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on 
Learning and Innovation.” Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1), 128–152. 
Coulter, Keith S and Robin A Coulter (2003) "The effects of industry knowledge on the 
development of trust in service relationships" International Journal of Research in Marketing 20 
(1), pp 31–43 
  
Cravens, David W., Thomas N. Ingram, Raymond W. Laforge, and Clifford E. Young (1993), 
“Behavior-Based and OUtcome-Based Salesforce Control Systems,” Journal of Marketing 57 
(4), 47-59. 
Crawford, Vincent P. (1990), “Relationship Specific Investment,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 105 (2) 561-574. 
Cron, William L, Greg W. Marshall, Jagdip Singh, Rosann L. Spiro and Harish Sujan (2005), 
“Salesperson Selection, Training, and Development:  Trends, Implications, and Research 
Opportunities,” Journal of Personal Selling and Sales Management 25 (2), 123-136. 
Crosby, Lawrence A., Kenneth A.  Evans, Deborah Cowles (1990), “Relationship Quality in 
Personal Selling:  An Interpersonal Influence Perspective” Journal of Marketing 54 (July), 68-
82. 
Cyert, Richard M. and James G. March (1963), A Behavioral Theory of the Firm.  Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ. 
Darmon, R. 2004. “Controlling salesforce turnover costs through optimal recruiting and training 
programs,” European Journal of Operations Research, 154 (1)  291-303. 
Davenport, T. H., and L. Prusack (1998). Working Knowledge: Realizing Your Company's True 
Value by Finding Its Hidden Brainpower.  Harper Business:; New York,  NY. 
Deeter-Schmelz, Dawn R. and Karen Norman Kennedy (2004), “Buyer-Seller Relationships and 
Information Sources in an E-Commerce World,” Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing 
19 (3), 188-196. 
Dierickx, Ingemar and Karel Cool. "Asset Stock Accumulation and Sustainability of Competitive 
Advantage" Management Science. Vol. 35, No. 12 (Dec., 1989), pp. 1504-1511. 
  
Donthu, Naveen, Edmund K. Hershbergerb, Talai Osmonbekovc (2005) "Benchmarking 
marketing productivity using data envelopment analysis" Journal of Business Research 58 (11), 
1474–1482. 
Dulles, Allen. 1963 The Craft of Intelligence. New York: Harper & Row.  
Dwyer,  Robert F., Paul H. Shurr, and Sejo Oh (1987), “Developing Buyer-Seller Relationships,” 
Journal of Marketing 51 (2), 11-27. 
Dyer, Jeffrey H. and Harbir SIngh (1998), “The Relational View:  Cooperative Strategy and 
Sources of Interorganizational Competitive Advantage” Academy of Management Review 23 (4), 
660-679. 
Eftimiades, Nicholas (1994), Chinese Intelligence Operations Naval Institute Press, Annapolis. 
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. (1989) "Building Theories from Case Study Research" The Academy of 
Management Review Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 532-550. 
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Martin, J. A. (2000). “Dynamic capabilities: What are they?” Strategic 
Management Journal, 21(10), 1105-1121. 
Espeland, Wendy N. and Mitchell L. Stevens (1998), “Commensuration as a Social Process,” 
Annual Review of Sociology  24, 313-343. 
Fagerberg, J. (2004) "Innovation: A Guide to the Literature" in J. Fagerberg, D. Mowery, R. 
Nelson (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Innovation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 1–29 
Flaherty, Karen, Son K. Lam, Nick Lee, Jay Mulki, and Andrea Dixon (2012), “Social Network 
Theory and the Sales Manager Role:  Engineering the Right Relationship Flows,” Journal of 
Personal Selling and Sales Management 32 (winter 1), 29-40. 
  
Franke, George R.  and Jeong-Eun Park (2006) "Salesperson Adaptive Selling Behavior and 
Customer Orientation: A Meta-Analysis" Journal of Marketing Research Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 
693-702. 
Friend, Scott B., Carolyn F. Curasi, James S. Boles, and Danny N. Bellenger (2014), “Why are 
you Really Losing Sales Opportunities?  A Buyer’s Perspective on the Determinants of Key 
Account Sales Failure,” Industrial Marketing Management 43 (), 1124-1135.  
Friend, Scott B. and Jeff S. Johnson (2014), “Key Account Relationships:  An Exploratory 
Inquiry of Customer-Based Evaluations,” Industrial Marketing Management 43 (4), 642-658. 
Gavetti, G., Levinthal, D. A., & Rivkin, J. W. (2005). “Strategy making in novel and complex 
worlds: The power of analogy.” Strategic Management Journal, 26(8), 691-712.  
Gonzalez, Gabriel R., Danny P. Claro, and Robert W. Palmatier (2014), “Synergistic Effects of 
Relationship Managers’ Social Networks on Sales Performance,” Journal of Marketing 78 
(January) pp. 76-94.  
Grant, Robert M. (1996), “Toward a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm,” Strategic 
Management Journal, Winter 1996, 109-122. 
Grant, Robert M. (2003), “Strategic planning in a turbulent environment: evidence from the oil 
majors.” Strategic Management Journal, 24: 491–517. 
Guenzi, Paola, Luigi M. De Luca, Gabriele Troilo (2011), “ Organizational Drivers of 
Salespeople’s Customer Orientation and Selling Orientation,” Journal of Personal Selling and 
Sales Management 31 (Summer) 265-289. 
Hair, Joseph F., William C. Black, Barry J. Babin, and Rolph E. Anderson (2010), Multivariate 
Data Analysis, 7th Edition.  Prentice Hall Publications. 
  
heterogenous. 2011. In Merriam-Webster.com.Retrieved May 8, 2011, from 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/heterogenous 
Hughes, Douglas E., Joel Le Bon, Adam Rapp (2013), “Gaining and Leveraging Customer-
Based Competitive Intelligence:  The Pivotal Role of Social Capital and Salesperson Adaptive 
Selling Skills,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 41 (1), 91-110. 
idiosyncrasy. 2011. In Merriam-Webster.com.Retrieved May 8, 2011, from http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/idiosyncrasy 
Ingram, Thomas N., RaymondW. LaForge, Ramon Avila, Charles H. Schwepker, Jr., and 
Michael R. Williams (2009) Sales Management: Analysis and Decision Making, 7th Edition 
(Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe). 
Ingram, Thomas N., Raymond W. LaForge, Ramon Avila,Charles H. Schwepker, Jr., and 
Michael R. Williams (2015), SELL, 4th Edition (Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning). 
Jantunen, Ari (2005) "Knowledge‐ processing capabilities and innovative performance: an 
empirical study", European Journal of Innovation Management, 8 (3), pp. 336-349 
Jap, S. D.. (2001). "Pie Sharing" in Complex Collaboration Contexts. Journal of Marketing 
Research, 38 (1), 86–99.  
 Jaramillo, Fernando J., Jay P. Mulki, and James S. Boles (2011), “Workplace stressors, job 
attitude, and job behaviors: Is interpersonal conflict the missing link?”  Journal of Personal 
Selling and Sales Management 31 (3), 339-356 
Johnson, James S. and Ravi S. Sohi (2013) “The curvilinear and conditional effects of product 
line breadth on salesperson performance, role stress, and job satisfaction,” Journal of the 
Academy of Marketing Science, 42 (1), 71-89. 
  
Johnston, W. J., & Bonoma, T. V.. (1981). “The Buying Center: Structure and Interaction 
Patterns.” Journal of Marketing, 45(3), 143–156. 
Kanter, Rosebeth Moss (1983),  The Change Masters:  Innovation for Productivity in the 
American Corporation,  New York, NY:  Simon and Schuster. 
Kaplan, S.. (2008) “Framing Contests: Strategy Making under Uncertainty”. Organization 
Science, 19(5), 729–752.  
Knight, Frank H. (1921) Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.  
Kogut, Bruce and Nalin Kulatilaka (1994), “Operating Flexibility, Global Manufacturing, and 
the Option Value of a Multinational Network" Management Science, 40 (1) pp. 123-139. 
Kogut, Bruce and Nalin Kulatilaka (2001), “Capabilities as Real Options,” Organization Science 
12 (6), 744-758. 
Langer, Ellen J. (1989) "Minding Matters: The Consequences of Mindlessness–Mindfulness" 
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 22, pp 137–173 
Leach, Desmond J., Toby D. Wall, and Paul R. Jackson (2003), “The Effect of Empowerment on 
Job Knowledge:  An Empirical Test Involving Operators of Complex Technology,”Journal of 
Operational and Organizational Psychology 76 (1), 27-52. 
Leigh, Thomas W., Thomas E. DeCarlo, David Allbright & James Lollar (2014) "Salesperson 
knowledge distinctions and sales performance", Journal of Personal Selling & Sales 
Management, 34:2, 123-140 
Levinthal, Daniel and Claus Rerup, (2006) “Crossing an Apparent Chasm: Bridging Mindful and 
Less-Mindful Perspectives on Organizational Learning”. Organization Science 17(4):502-513. 
Liu, Yuping (2007), “The long-Term Impact of Loyalty Programs on Consumer Purchase 
Behavior and Loyalty,” Journal of Marketing 71 (October), 19-35. 
  
Lohtia, Ritu, Daniel C. Bello, Terahisu Yamada, and David I. Gilliland (2005), “The Role of 
Commitment in Foreign-Japanese Relationships:  Mediating Performance for Foreign Sellers in 
Japan,” Journal of Business Research 58 (8), 1009-1018. 
MacNeil, Ian R. (1980), “Power, Contract, and the Economic Model,” Journal of Economic 
Issues 14 (4), 909-923. 
Mantrala, M. K., Sinha, P., & Zoltners, A. A.. (1994). Structuring a Multiproduct Sales Quota-
Bonus Plan for a Heterogeneous Sales Force: A Practical Model-Based Approach. Marketing 
Science, 13(2), 121–144. 
Mantrala, M. K., Albers, S., Caldieraro, F., Jensen, O., Joseph, K., Krafft, M., … Lodish, L.. 
(2010). Sales force modeling: State of the field and research agenda. Marketing Letters, 21(3), 
255–272.  
March, James G. (1991), “Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning,”  
Organization Science (1), 71-87. 
March, James G. and H. A. Simon (1958), Organizations.  Wiley:  Oxford, England.  
Marlin, D., & Geiger, S.W. (2015), A reexamination of the organizational slack and innovation 
relationship, Journal of Business Research (In Press) 
McDonald, Malcolm, Tony MIllman, and Beth Rogers (1997), “Key Account Management:  
Theory, Practice, and Challenges,” Journal of Marketing Management 13 (8), 737-757. 
Menguc, Bulent, Seigyoung Auh, and Aypar Uslu (2013), “Customer Knowledge Creation 
Capability and Performance in Sales Teams,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 41 
(1) 19-39. 
  
Miles, Andrew and Eugene Sadler-Smith (2014), “With Recruitment I Feel I Always Need to 
Listen to My Gut: The Role of Intuition in  Employee Selection,” Personnel Review 43 (4) 
606-627. 
Moncrief, William C., Greg W. Marshall, and Felicia G. Lassk (2006), “A Contemporary 
Taxonomy of Sales Positions,” Journal of Personal Selling and Sales Management 26 (1) 55-65. 
Mullins, Ryan R., Michael Ahearne, Son K. Lam, Zachary R. Hall, and Jeffrey P. Boichuk 
(2014), “Know your customer:  How Salesperson Perceptions of Customer Relationship ?Quality 
Form and Influence Account Profitability,”  Journal Marketing 78, Number 6, pp. 38-58. 
Nadkarni, S. and Barr, P. S. (2008), “Environmental context, managerial cognition, and strategic 
action: an integrated view” Strategic Management Journal, Vol 29 (13), pp. 1395–1427. 
Nissen, Helle Aaroe, Madbriit Rostgaard Avald,  Ann Hojbjerg Clarke (2014), “Knowledge 
Sharing in Heterogeneous Teams Through Collaboration and Cooperation:  Exemplified 
Through Public-Private Innovation Partnerships,” Industrial Marketing Management 43 (April 
3), 473-482. 
Ohanian, Ara A. (2007), “Smarter Sales,” Training 44 (6), 19. 
Ocasio, William (1997), “Towards an Attention-Based View of the Firm,” Strategic 
Management Journal 18 (Summer), 187-206. 
Ouchi, William G. (1980), “Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans,” Administrative Science 
Quarterly Vol. 25, No. 1 (Mar., 1980), pp. 129-141. 
Palmatier, Robert W. , Rajiv P. Dant, Dhruv Grewal and Kenneth R. Evans (2006)  "Factors 
Influencing the Effectiveness of Relationship Marketing: A Meta-Analysis" Journal of 
Marketing 70 (4), pp. 136-153 
  
Palmatier, Robert W., Lisa K. Scheer, Mark B. Houston, Kenneth R. Evans, and Srinath 
Gopalakrishna (2007), “Use of Relationship Marketing Programs in Building Customer-
Salesperson and Customer-Firm Relationships:  Differential Influences on Financial Outcomes” 
International Journal of Research in Marketing 24 (2 ), 210-223. 
Rackham, Neil (1988), Spin Selling, New York, NY:  McGraw Hill Publishers. 
Rapp, Adam, Michael Ahearne, John Mathieu, and Niels Schillewaert (2006) "The impact of 
knowledge and empowerment on working smart and working hard: The moderating role of 
experience" International Journal of Research in Marketing, 23 (3), pp. 279–293 
Ring, Peter Smith and Andrew H. van de Ven (1994), "Developmental Processes of Cooperative 
Interorganizational Relationships," Academy of Management Review Vol. 19, No. 1 (Jan., 1994), 
pp. 90-118. 
Ryals, Lynette J. and Iain A. Davies (2013), “Where’s the Strategic Intent in Key Account 
Relationships,” Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing 28 (2), 111-124. 
Sallee, Amy and Karen Flaherty (2003), “Enhancing Salesperson Trust:  An Examination of 
Managerial Values, Empowerment, and the Moderating Influence of SBU Strategy,” Journal of 
Personal Selling and Sales Management 23 (4), 299-310. 
Samaha, Stephen A., Joshua T. Beck, and Robert W. Palmatier (2014), “The Role of Culture in 
International Relationship Marketing,” Journal of Marketing 78 (September) pp. 78-98. 
Saxe, R., & Weitz, B. A.. (1982), “The SOCO Scale: A Measure of the Customer Orientation of 
Salespeople.” Journal of Marketing Research, 19(3), 343–351. 
Sengupta, Sanjit, Robert E. Krapfel, and Michael A. Pusateri (2000), “An Empirical 
Investigation of Key Account Salesperson Effectiveness,” Journal of Personal Selling and Sales 
Management 20 (4), 253-261. 
  
Sharma, A., Levy, M., & Evanschitzky, H.. (2007). “The Variance in Sales Performance 
Explained by the Knowledge Structures of Salespeople.” The Journal of Personal Selling and 
Sales Management, 27(2), 169–181.  
Sim, D. (2015, February 3). Moon for sale? US government says Bigelow Aerospace could set 
up lunar base with land rights. International Business Times. Retrieved October 20, 2015, from 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/moon-sale-us-government-says-bigelow-aerospace-could-set-lunar-
base-land-rights-1486458  
Singh, J. (2000). "Performance Productivity and Quality of Frontline Employees in Service 
Organizations" Journal of Marketing, 64 (2), 15–34. 
Skiera, Bernd and Sönke Albers (2008), "Prioritizing Sales Force Decision Areas for 
Productivity Improvements Using a Core Sales Response Function" The Journal of Personal 
Selling and Sales Management 28 (2), pp. 145-154. 
Spiro, Rosann L. and Barton A. Weitz "Adaptive Selling: Conceptualization, Measurement, and 
Nomological Validity" Journal of Marketing Research Vol. 27, No. 1 (Feb., 1990), pp. 61-69 
Sujan, H., Weitz, B. A., & Kumar, N.. (1994). "Learning Orientation, Working Smart, and 
Effective Selling." Journal of Marketing, 58(3), 39–52. 
Sun-Tzu (1993), The Art of Warfare.  Ballentine Books, a Division of Random House, Inc.; New 
York, N.Y., 1993. 
Tan, Justin, and Mike W. Peng (2003) "Organizational Slack and Firm Performance During 
Economic Transitions: Two Studies from an Emerging Economy" Strategic Management 
Journal, Vol. 24, pp. 1249-1263. 
Teece, D. J., Pisano, G. and Shuen, A. (1997), “Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic 
Management.” Strategic Management Journal, 18: 509–533. 
  
Teece, D. J. (2007), “Explicating dynamic capabilities: the nature and microfoundations of 
(sustainable) enterprise performance.” Strategic Management Journal, 28: 1319–1350. 
Terho, Harri, Andreas Eggert, Alexander Haas, and Wolfgang Ulaga (2015), “How Sales 
Strategy Translates into Performance:  The Role of Salesperson Customer Orientation and 
Value-Based Selling,” Industrial Marketing Management 45 (February), 12-21. 
Trigeorgis, Lenos (1996), Real Options:  Managerial Flexibility and Strategy in Resource 
Allocation.  MIT Press:  Cambridge, MA. 
Tsai, Wenpin (2001), “Knowledge Transfer in Inter-organizational Networks:  Effects of 
Network Position and Organizational Capacity on Business Unit Organization and Performance, 
” Academy of Management Journal  44 (5), 996-1004. 
Tuomi, Ilkka (1999), “Data is More Than Knowledge:  Implications of the Reversed Knowledge 
Hierarchy for Knowledge Management and Organizational Memory,” Journal of Management 
Information Systems 16 (3), 103-117. 
Verbeke, Willem, Bart Dietz, and Ernst Verwaal (2011), “Drivers of Sales Performance:  A 
Contemporary Meta-Analysis.  Have Salespeople Become Knowledge Brokers,” Journal of the 
Academy of Marketing Science 39 (3), 407-428 
Wang, Guangping and Richard G. Netemeyer 2004, “Salesperson Creative Performance: 
Conceptualization, Measurement, and Nomological Validity ” Journal of Business Research 57 
(8), 805-812. 
Weitz, B. A.. (1978) “Relationship between Salesperson Performance and Understanding of 
Customer Decision Making.” Journal of Marketing Research, 15(4), 501–516. 
Weitz, B. A., Sujan, H., & Sujan, M.. (1986). “Knowledge, Motivation, and Adaptive Behavior: 
A Framework for Improving Selling Effectiveness.” Journal of Marketing, 50(4), 174–191.  
  
Williamson, Oliver E. (1981), “The Economics of Organizations:  The Transaction Cost 
Approach,” American Journal of Sociology 87 (3), 548-577. 
Ye, J., Marinova, D., and Singh, J. (2007). “Strategic Change Implementation and Performance 
Loss in the Front Lines.” Journal of Marketing, 71 (4), 156–171. 
Ye, Jun, Detelina Marinova, and Jagdip Singh (2012) “Bottom-up learning in marketing 
frontlines: conceptualization, processes, and consequences,” Journal of the Academy of 
Marketing Science 40 (6), 821–844 
Zollo, M., & Winter, S. G.. (2002). "Deliberate Learning and the Evolution of Dynamic 
Capabilities." Organization Science, 13(3), 339–351. 
Zoltners, Andris A., Prabhakant Sinha, and Sally E. Lorimer (2006), The Complete Guide to 
Sales Force Incentive Compensation: How to Design and Implement Plans That Work.  
AMACOM:  New York, NY. 
Zoltners, Andris A., Prabhakant Sinha and Sally E. Lorimer (2009), Building a Winning Sales 
Force:  Powerful Strategies for Driving HIgh Performance.  AMACOM:  New York, NY. 
 
  
 
